(Enlbge of Utbrral Arts
Utbrarg
The Gift of flutfeQfc
37874-4
BOSTON UNI VARSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
Tnesis
THE STHICS OF B3RTRAND RUSS2LL
Reginald Burton Nichols
(A.B., Ohio Weeleyan University, 1922)
(S.T.B., Boston University, 1925)
submitted in partial fulfilment of tne
requirements for tne degree of
Master of Arts
1932
bOSTON UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
LIBRARY
4^5 32.
37«r. 7+4-
SO
THE iSTHI CS OF BSRTRAND RUSSELL.
OUTLINE.
I. Introduction.
A. The Scope and Aim of This Thesis. 1
B. A Note on His Life, ^
C. Russell's "Position in Philosophy. 5
1. His Relation to English Philosophy. g
2. His Epistemological Views. 7
3* His Metaphysical Views. 10
4. Man ani the Universe in Russell's Philosophy. n
D. Russell's Regard for Science and His Use of Scientific
Met nod in Philosophy. j.5
II • Russell's Ethical Views. 18
A. His Earlier Outlook. 13
B. His Leaning Toward Subjectivism in His Later Outlook. 22
C. The Ethics of Desire and the Good Life. 24
1. Man's Relation to Nature and. tne Place of Values. 24
2. Philosophical Development of the Ethics of Desire. 25
a* Ethics and Morals Contrasted and Defined. 2 5
To. Theories Regarding Virtue. 27
c. How We Find the "Good." 29
d. The Supreme Moral Rule of tne Etnics of Desire. 31
3* The Good Life, 32
a* Meaning of Love. 33
b. Meaning of Knowledge. 34
4. Itesire as the Basis of Etnics and the Good Life. 35
5. Criticism of Russell's Ethics of Desire. 36
D. Moral Codes and Conventional Morality. 42
1. "°lace of Moral Codes* 42
2. His Criticism of Conventional Morality. 44
a. Superstition in Conventional Morality. 47
b. Pear as a Disruptive Force in Moral Life. 49
c. His Condemnation of Puritanism. 51
3- His Views on Sex and Sexual Morality. 52
E. The ""lace of Hap-oiness in the Good Life. 56
P. Education in Relation to the Good Life. 56
1* Reason as a Factor in Life. 66
2. Scientific Method as a Means of Finding the Truth. 67
3. Purpose ani Method in Educations 68
4. Criticism of Traditional Methods in Education. . 70
5. Ideals for Education in Achieving the Good Life. 71
i
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OUT LI Nil
"°age
III* Russell's Social Views. 73
A. In General. 73
B. The "Place of the Individual in Society. 77
1. Social Aspects of the Good Life. 79
C. His Views on the State, 80
1* The Evil of War, 82
2. Internationalism as a Way Out. 85
D* His Views Regarding Property and Economic Systems* 87
E* What Science Can Do. 91
1. "The Scientific Society." 92
IV* Russell's Attitude Toward Religion. 9 5
A. His Estimate of Traditional Religion and the Churches. 9 5
3. His Own Religion. 98
1. "Science and Values." 100
V* What I Think About Russell and His Ethical Views. 1G2
Summary 10 5
U
Bibliography 109
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THIS ETHICS OF BSftTRAiiD RUSSSLL
I. Introduction,
A* The Scope and Aim of this Thesis.
An extensive study of the theoretical and practical ethics of
Bert rand Russell is undertaken* Analysis and criticism of his
thought is attempted. His social views are presented as briefly
and comprehensively as seems possible with the mass of material
available. As a background, for anyone not familiar with Russell's
philosophy, a brief survey of his epistemo logical and methphysioal
views is presented. Changes in his ethical views are indicated,
but no attempt is made to show the changes in his general philoeopfiy.
B. A Note on His Life.
Bert rand Arthur William Russell was born at Trellech, ."England,
May 18, 1872. He is now the 3rd Sari Russell. He was educated at
Trinity College, Cambridge, and became a lecturer and Fellow of
Trinity. He was elected Fellow of the Royal Society in 1908* In
1894 he married Alys, daughter of R. Pearsall Smith of Philadelphia,
but she divorced him in 1931* In the same year Russell married
Dora Winifred, daughter of the late Sir Frederick Black, ^t C. B.
There are two children, a son and a daughter, by this marriage.
Bertrand Russell's grandfather was Lord Jonn Russell, "one of
the greatest Liberal ?rime Ministers of the last century," wno was
noted for his fearlessness and honesty* ani worked for emancipa-
tion of the Jews and freedom for Canada and Australia.1 Bertrand 's
father was a noted free thinker, and he "wrote strongly for
1"Thought of Bertrand Russell," Living Age, 310 (1921) PP« 585-589.
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free thought in religion." Bert rand was only two years old when
his mother died, and three when his father died, after which he
went to live with his grandmother, who "was a Scotch Presbyterian
but at the age of seventy became converted to Unitarianism. " The
result was that Bert^and was "taken on alternate Sundays to the
parish church (Episcopalian) and to the Presbyterian church, while
at home (he) was instructed in the tenets of the Unitarian faith."1
He is himself a fearless proponent of freedom in politics, in in-
dustry, in education, and in society. When his ancestry and en-
vironment in the early years is considered, it is not surprising
that this is so.
Concerning his early training he says, "Prom the age of ele-
ven, when I began the study of Euclid, I had a passionate interest
in mathematics, combined with a belief that science must be the
source of all human progress. Youthful ambition made me wish to
be a benefactor of mankind, the more so as I lived in an atmos-
2
phere in which nubile spirit was taken for granted.* He found
later that while abstract mathematics was a simple subject for
him, the more concrete matters of science did not come easily,
so he gave up the scientific career he had hoped to follow. He
then turned to philosophy and the study of logic led him more
deeply into mathematics. After reading Mill's Log! c , he deter-
mined that he "would find out whether any grounds were ascertain-
3
able for regarding mathematics as true." This proved to be an
XB. Russell, "What I Believe," Forum, 82(1929), p. 129.
2Sele cted ^apers of Bert rand Russell, Introduction, p. IX.
3Ibid.,p. X.
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extensive task and took a period of nearly twenty years to com-
plete. In 1910, in collaboration with A. £• Whitehead, he pub-
lished Princi-pia Mathematioa. which, he says, "contained all that
I could hope to contribute towards the solution of the problem."
Ke adds, "The main question remained, of course, unanswered; but
incidentally we had been led to the invention of a new method in
philosophy and a new branch of mat hematics ."i
Russell was always interested in politics and took an active
part in the campaign for women's suffrage from 1907 onwards.2
His interests continued to be mainly academic and abstract, how-
ever, until the coming of the World War. Then all was changed.
In fact, Will Durant declares "There have been two Bert rand Rue-
sells: one died during the war; and another who rose out of that
one '8 shroud, and almost mystic communist born out of the ashes
of a mathematical logician."3 Russell was amazed at the attitude
of both governments and people towards the war. "It became ob-
vious," he says, "that I had lived in a fool's paradise. Human
nature, even among those who had thought themselves civilized,
had dark depths that I had not suspected. Civilization, which
I had thought secure, showed itself capable of generating destruc-
tive forces which threatened a disaster comparable to the fall of
Rome. Everything that I had valued was jeopardized, and only an
infinitesimal minority seemed to mind."4 Abstract pursuits became
impossible and Russell wrote much in an effort to arouse the
^Loc. cit.
2Ibid., f. XI.
Swill Durant, The Story of Philosophy, p. 519.
4Bertrand Russell, op. cit., pp. XL-XII.
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general p-ublic to undertake the building of "a pacific sooiety."
In 1916 he wrote to President Wilson asking him to use his in-
fluence to stop the war before it destroyed Europe, He was not
successful in arousing the people, but he had to pay the penalty
for his fearless thinking and speaking.
For his opposition to the war on grounds of "common sense
and humanity, " and for upholding conscientious objectors in their
contentions and opinions, he was fined one hundred pounds in 1916.
Ke was dismissed from his professorship at Trinity Oollege, Cam-
bridge, and was refused permission to come to America to deliver
a series of lectures at Harvard University in the same year. He
was forbididen to lecture at home also, unless he would give assur-
ances that he would say nothing which the military authorities
might deem dangerous* He refused to give such assurances because,
he declared, he could not tell in advance what they might object
to, or just what they might consider dangerous to the interests
of the war. He served a sentence of six months in prison for
writing an article "warning the English people that employment
of American troops in Britain involved serious danger."1 Thus
Russell has vindicated his faith in freedom by suffering for it.
Though he hates violence and oppression in every form, Rus-
sell is not an anarchist. He believes law and order necessary
for the progress of humanity, and would have the police use force
if necessary to preserve it, but the use of force by private in-
dividuals he believes harmful.2 He appears to have thought very
^"Thought of Bertrand Russell," Living Age,, p. 587.
Ibid.> p. 588.
highly of Communion at one time, but he was disappointed by the
oppressive tactics of Communists in Russis, though he blames out-
side capitalists for much of Russia's trouble,1
When the war was over he found himself unable to return to
academic pursuits, so he traveled through eastern Europe and
Asia, spending five weeks in Russia and about a year lecturing
in China. He was interested now chiefly in society and social
institutions, and found much that interested him in these coun-
tries so different from those where western civilization holds
sway.2 During the years since, he has devoted himself largely
to the study of social conditions with an eye to the amelioration
of existing evils in human society. His interest in science and
philosophy has been considerable, but chiefly in their bearing
on social problems. He believes that there is no one key to the
solution of these problems, but holds that all viewpoints in
philosophy and all branches of science must combine to build a
better social order.3
Though not a professed follower of Christ, but, indeed, a
professed atheist, we are told that Russell's attitudes often
remind one of the Nazarene, and especially is this true in his
4
reverence for the souls of young children. Will Durant declares
he is "a better Christian than many who mouth the word."5
i"Loc» cit*
2Seiected Papers, ibid*, pp. JII-XIII.
^Ibid,, o. XYIII.
rLi vi ng Age , op . > cit . t >p . 589.
Vill Durant, op. cit., p. 529.
*
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C- Russell^ Position in "Philosophy.
1. Hfts Relation to English Philosophy.
Though we are told that no "ism" quite fits Russell,1 an
agree that he classifies as a new realist and is frequently men-
tioned as the leading figure of that realistic philosophical
movement which has arisen recently in England and America. Pre-
vious to his "becoming known as a philosopher, Russell was a pro-
fessor of mathematical science. From this he passed on to the
field of philosophy, drawn very strongly no doubt by his inter-
est in humanity and its social problems. But his earlier inter-
ests in mathematics have given him a predisposition for logic,
so that he takes very kindly to the analytic method of new real-
ism and is known as a "logical atomist" by some. He was pro-
bably influenced towards logic by his studies in the mathemati-
cal philosophy of Leibnitz during his earlier years.
We are told that Russell "achieves the remarkable result
of standing for a naive empirical realism, and, with the same
uncompromising firmness, for a high and dry "Platonic idealism,
or, since, in his philosophy, both are forms of realism, for
realism in the modern sense and for realism in the medieval
sense." Though he has his critics, his originality and power
are admitted generally, and he is spoken of in the highest terms
by such men as R. B. ^erry, Bradley, Bosanquet, and Royoe, all
of whom by no means agree with his philosophical views. *
Pite, "fhilosophy of Bertrand Russell," Nation, p. 180.
2Loc. cit. eoe eo_
3"?hought of Bertrand Russell," Living Age, pp. 585-586.
2. His Epist emological Views.
Russell has remarkable command of modern mathematical logic*
For him "philosophy is the austere vision of eternal truth, ma-
jestic in its isolation from man's paltry life," and of the "un-
changing "bonds of logical implication."1 This newer mathematics
of groups and series "claims to have devised a calculus of rela-
tions which will cover all 'entities' whatsoever; not oAly vol-
umes and numbers, but persons* ideas, sensations, emotions*
prices, moral values* commercial transactions, --anything you
please. From this point of view truth of any kind is a question
of mathematical relations; and what cannot be expressed in sym-
bols is not true."2 Thus Russell's "real" world consists only
of logical relationships, applicable to all possible worlds, so
that they do not prove very helpful in solving problems in our
world. They may solve some mathematical problems but not many
other more common problems* It appears to be simply the case of
a narrow and restricted type of logic pronouncing its own supre-
macy over the rest of life.3
In his earlier works, The Problems of 13 hi losophy and Our
Knowle Ige of the External World, Russell"make8 a sharp distinc-
tion between the world of sense data and the world of physics.*4
The sense data constitute our experience. Yet these sense data
are independent of the mind.^ If I see a table, I do not see the
real physical table. What I see is one "perspective" of a sensible
^A. Km Rogers, English and American Philosophy Since 1800, p. 429.
^W. Fite, op. cit.
3a. K. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 433-5.
4 J. A. Leighton, The Field of Philosophy, ^p. 289.
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object that is my experience of the table. The "perspective" is
the group of sense data which const it ute5 the sensible object from
that one particular point of view. Any sensible object, then,
consists of the total series of "perspectives" from all possible
points of view.
"Since these^perspe ctives are related to the percipient , and
to one another according to certain laws which are formulated
in the science of Tohysios, 'Things are those series of aepe ct s
which obey the laws of physi cs. That such series exTst is an
empirical fact, which constitutes the verif iability of physics.1
But physics presupposes one common space. Now the individual
does not sense one space--the space of sight differs from the
space of touch. The one space for the individual is an intel-
lectual construction."1
Now each individual has only his own private space or "perspect i^^*
but there are as many spaces as there are observers, and there
are an infinite number of possible snaces which an infinite num-
ber of possible observers might perceive. These possible aspects
exist whether there is anyone to perceive them or not, because
things exist regardless of whether there is anyone to know about
them or not. Here is where realism makes one of its sharp breaks
with the absolute idealism of Berkley. But all "these aspects
constitute the system of perspectives which makes up the real
world of physics."2 Thus the common 3pace of the object is a
logical construction from all these private spaces.3
"It is to be noted that, in order to get from the 'private *
world of each separate individual into this public space- system,
Russell has to assume the existence of other minds. He admits
that we cannot offer very strong proof of the existence oj other
minds, but holds that we cannot help believing in them.
-•■Ibid., p. 290.
2Ibid.> p. 291.
3a. K. Rogers, op. cit., ot>. 435-7.
4 J. A. Leighton, op. cit., p. 291.
It appears that so far Russell is a dualist in his dpiste-
mological outlook, in which he differs from American realists,
who hold to monism in epistemology . He assumes that minds exist
and are active in making logical constructions. Sense data also
exist for minds hut are caused by something outside of minds*
Then there is also the physical obje ct which exists independently
of any and all minds. Since all that we know of this object is
logical construction that the mind makes out of the sense date,
it is difficult to say just what the physical object really is*
Also the relation of objects oerceivei to the sense data seems
rather uncertain. "Ghosts and centaurs are things equally real
with trees and mountains, except that they cannot be correlated
in the same space construction,.... an, explanation convenient for
a theory of error, but not intrinsically convincing. 1,1 Thus
Russell appears to have returned to sensationalism. His conten-
tion that the mind is active in the logical construction of the
sensible object, ani that the physical object is such as ©an
never be truly experienced by the mind reminds one of Kant*s
doctrine of the creative activity of the mind and the "thing-in-
itself Is it possible that the "thing-in-it self " thrown out
the back-door by the realists could "climb up some other way"
and be reinstated in a new scientific dress?
It should bs noted also that when Russell takes for granted
the making of logical construction by the mind, he not only as-
sumes a mind capable of organization, but he also assumes that
^Aa.X. Rogers, oo. cit., pp.. 439-440.
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the isolated sense data are capable of being organized into a sys
tea, which aeana essentially that they are already part of a sys-
tem.
3. Hi 8 Metaphysical Views.
Metaphysically, Russell is a pluralist or "logical atomist."
He holds that teras and relations exist entirely independently of
one another. It is the business of philosophy to reduce the com-
plexes of experience to their simple atomic elements (terms and
relations) by logical analysis.
In The Analysi s of Mind, Russell takes the position of neutral
monism held by m03t neo-realists. This view does not recognize
minds or selves as separate entities. Everything is analyzed down
to neutral entities, which may be either mind or matter. An ofrject
or a mind is simply a particular arrangement of these entities.
"The person is constituted by relations of the thoughts to each
other and to the body."2 Leighton gives it as his judgment that
this * 'neutral* aonism is only a new and specious name for materi-
alism,"3 and many critics of the neo-realistic position agree with
this. It is a pan-objectivism, which seeks to eliminate mind or
consciousness as an independent agency in the metaphysical world,
reducing everything to "terms and relations" or "logical atoms."
It seems clear that this is thorough- going materialism, even
though much more refined than some classical forms of it.
*A. K. Rogers, op. cit., px>. 436-7.
2 J. A. Leighton, oo. cit., p. 292.
3Ibid., p. 293.
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4* Man ani the Universe in Russell's Philosophy,
Russell finds an "irreconcilable opposition between human
ideals and the physical uni verse. " Science presents a world pur-
poseless and devoid of meaning, he thinks. I quote him:
"Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the
end they were achieving; his origin, his growtn, his hopes and
fears> his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of acci-
dental collocations of atoms; no fire, no heroism, no intensity
of thought and feeli ng» can preserve an individual life beyond
the grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devotion,
all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human gen-
ius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar
system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must
inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruinst-
all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly
certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.
Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm
foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation
henceforth be safely built,"l
Man is the mysterious child of "Nature," subject to her
power, yet "with, the capacity of judging all the works of his
unthinking Mother." He is free "to examine, to criticize, to
know, and in imagination to create," He is the only creature
in the world having this power, "and in this lies his superior-
ity to the resistless forces that control his outward lifs,"2
However, there are within man ideals which aseert them-
selves gradually and man is not satisfied to worship blind Power
as he finds it in nature. He demands a world of fact which shall
be harmonious with his world of ideals, and, not finding it in
the world of nature, he "creates God, all-powerful and all-good,
the mystic unity of what is and what ought to be, "3 The world of
-''Mysticism and IiOgic, "A Free Man's Tor ship," p. 48.
^Ibid., loc, cit,
3Ibid. , p. 49'
fact is not good and man is a helpless atom in it« Man finis
himself confronted with the choice of worshiping an evil God
that exists as "^ower in nature, or a goodness recognized as the
creation 6f his own conscience, Man finds his true freedom in
rejecting this "Power from his heart and worshiping only the "God
created by our own love of the good." "In action, in desire, we
must submit perpetually to the tyranny of outside forces; but in
thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellowmen,
free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotent ly crawl,
free even, while we live, from the tyranny of death."1
Thus we should submit our desires and aspirations to the
"Power that is; but our thoughts should remain free to create the
world of freedom and beauty af the ideals* Through the imagina-
tion we can transform the world into our temple of worship. Here
self must die out; it is only by renunciation of desires for
power in the world of fiact that we can find wisdom, insight, and
heaven, in the world of ideals. To cjuote again:
"Of all the arts, Tragedy is the proudest, the most trium-
phant; for it builds its shining citadel in the very center of
the enemy's country, on the very summit of his highest moun-
tain; from its impregnable watchtowers, his camps and arsenals,
his columns and forts, are all revealed; within its walls the
free life continues, while the legions of Death and ^ain and
Despair, and all the servile captains of tyrant Pate, afford
the burghers of that dauntless city new spectacles of beauty.
Happy those sacred ramparts, thrice happy the dwellers on that
all-seeing eminence. Honor to those brave warriors who, through
countless ages of warfare, have preserved for us the priceless
heritage of liberty, and have kept undefiled by sacrilegious
invaders the home of the unsubdued."2
So man must build his world of values without hope of cosmic
*Ibid. , p. 50.
~Ibid. , pp. 53- 54.
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aupport for them, according to Russell's belief. Indeed, he
must eapect that they shall "be ground to powder like himself.
"Brief and powerless is man's life; on him and all his
race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. .. .The life
of man is a long march through the night, surrounded by in-
visible foes, tortured by weariness and pain, towards a goal
that few can hope to reach, and where none may tarry long.
One by one, as they march, our oomrades vanish from our sight,
seized by the silent orders of omnipotent Death* . » .1? or Man,
condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to
pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish,
ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his
little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of
Eate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built ;
undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free
from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly
defiant of the irre si stable forces that tolerate, for a mo-
ment, hi 8 knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone,
a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals
have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious
power.
I have quoted Russell at such length because of the majesty
and grandeur of the view of life which he builds upon a founda-
tion of absolute despair. To quote one reviewer:
"The ethical problem for the human race, to follow Bert rand
Russell, is to discover how. in an alien and inhuman world, to
preserve its aspirations untarnished. ... Uoon the basis of a
seemingly pessimistic disillusion and a completely lugubrious
despair, this 'scientific* philosopher invests his gloomy
belief with so much nobility and courage that it becomes
stimulating and inspiring instead of depressing."*-
It is natural and logical that one who is a materialist in
philosophy should despair of any basis in life for values, but
it seems rather anomalous for a materialist to value so highly
the ideal life of man. However, we find in George Santayana
another of one who values the ideal life very highly, though
••■Ibid., ot>. 55-57,
2"Man's War with the Universe in the Religion of Bert rand
Russell", Current Opinion, 65 (1918), pp. 45-4o.
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he claims to be a materialist. But why should it be worth while
to cherish this ideal life so carefully if it is merely a passing
whim of man's imagination? It appears that Russell finds facts
in experience which conflict with his scientific theory, and in
the interests of strict logio he sinks his facts in the interest
of his theory. Yet, in the words of another critic;
"Russell's facts are more important than his theory. His
facts are a world in which moral persons bravely strive on,
even when appearances are most unfriendly, a loyalty to ob-
ligation that will not be frustrated while it can breathe.
His theory is of a pumoseless, godless universe. Do not
hi 8 facts cry aloud for a God? If the universe is as he
understands it to be, the existence of meaning and value
in human experience is^sheer miracle."!
This seems to me a valid criticism of Russell's position.
Russell refuses to believe in the objectivity of values,
or that the universe in any way seeks to conserve them, yet
"the existence of values in human life is hard to explain if
the universe itself be entirely indifferent to value."2 How
shall we explain the rise of Russell's own idealism in all its
grandeur as pictured above so graphically? Man is himself a
product of this blind unconscious power that he believes nature
to be, yet within man there appear these idealistic values which
make life truly worth living. Does it not follow that these
ideals exist within the world of nature if this is all the world
there is? How can one escape, then, the logical conclusion that
values are the product of nature through man? And if values are
the produot of nature then they must have a place in nature.
Where is Russell's logical analysis here, that it does not func-
(tion?
l3. S. Bright man, Religious. Values, pp. 58-59.
2S. S. Brightman, Introduction to ^hilosopiiy, p. 151.
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It appear 8 that if there is any way for these values
to exist outside the system of "logical atoms" and "relations"
of which Russell holds the world is composed, then the world of
atoms and relations, or "neutral entities," is not the only
world, and we have a dualism. Russell seeks to get by this
dilemma "by denying reality to the ideal values, but here he is
not true to experience, for he finds these ideals to be facts
of experience capable of affecting man's life, since ha may
rise out of the world of nature to live in the world of ideals.
If they have no objectivity how can they be capable of affecting
man's life, or how could man experience them at all? It seems
quite improper and unscientifio for a "scientific philosopher"
to pass by facts or experience as not worthy of serious con-
sideration, yet this is what Russell appears to do. Of course,
he considers them from one angle, and admits they are the most
important thing in life, but he gives them no place in the world
of nature, that is, according to his theory, there is no place
for them. The existence of spiritual life in a completely ma-
terialistic universe is a "brute mystery" anyway, but Russell
seems to dismiss it arbitrarily because it does not fit in his
theory.
D» Russell's Regard for Science and His Use of Scientific
Method in Philosophy.
In mathematics Russell found his ideal of reality, pure and
perfect, in the form of a. priori propositions, which stated re-
lations that he held to be objectively real, regardless of
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persone or things. With this as his ileal of reality he moved
over into a study of science and philosophy. The impersonal
nature of scientific method therefore appealed to him and he
became a great admirer of science and scientists* Consequently
he has come to have an almost undue amount of respect for the
methods of science and some of its findings* Since science can
deal only with material elements, and the immaterial facts and
forces of life cannot be handled in such an impersonal and ab-
stract way, Russell has given tne material consi derations an
unduly exalted place, especially in his theories. He contends
that scientific method should be applied In philosophy. * Fur-
ther, he holds that scientific philosophy must be general; it
must not deal with anything specific that exists in space or
time, but may deal with such things as space and time themselves*
"A philosophical proposition must be such as can be neither proved
nor disproved by empirical evidence. "2 suoh things belong to the
field of science* Thus philosophy is practically identified with
and limited to logic* It should deal with its problems piece-
meal, and not as wholes. "The essence of philosophy as thus
conceived is analysis, not synthesis." It is not to "suild
systems" but to "divide and conquer*"3 This is surely carrying
the scientific method over into philosophy with a vengeance*
Philosophy is sublimated to logic and logic is identified with
pure mathematics* How can philosophy touch the practical
2Ibid., p. Ill*
3Ibid., p. 113*
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problems of life? Where do the empirical facts of life fit in
such a view?
It seems a strange inconsistency that Russell should
be willing to recognize the abstractions of pure mathematics
and pure logic as ultimate realities, partaking of the nature
of Plato's ideas, ttatt he is unwilling to recognize as real the
values of man's inner life. These values he thinks but an
anomaly in a hostile universe, too abstract to be considered
as having a place in reality, yet logical abstractions are pure
reality. By what standard shall these distinctions be drawn?
Apparently only by the standard of Russell's desire to reduce
everything to mathematics or analytical logic.
Another strange thing about his point of view is that he
should hold the logical abstractions of pure reason to be the
highest ultimate s of reality, and yet deny that the power to
think is inherent in the nature of things. Nature is unthinking,
unoonscious power, he contends* How does it happen then that
these a priori propositions are universally valid? How does
anything come to be a priori?
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II. Russell's Ethical Views.
A. His Earlier Outlook.
It is a difficult matter to define Russell's ethical posi-
tion exactly for his views have changed with the passing of the
years, as the views of any live thinker are bound to do.
In his earliest essay on ethical subjects, "The Elements of
Ethics, 1,1 he has a thoroughly objective view of the "good." It
is an ultimate idea which is better characterized and illustrated
than defined, he thinks. The "good" is not confined to what
exists, or what ought to exist. He denies that "good meams what
is desired," since there are many bad desires. He maintains
that "good" and "bad" are not used in ethics to mean merely per-
sonal desires, but have an impersonal significance. That is,
goodness is a property which a thing possesses regardless of
opinions about it, for opinions may differ regarding the goodness
of a given thing or action, but whatever goodness there is therein
is an intrinsic element not affected by personal desires and
opinions. ^ Neither does knowledge about what exists throw any
light upon what is good or bad. Things are not good or bad be-
cause they exist or do not exist. Evolutionary ethics holds
that what has survived is the best, therefore what exists may be
held to be "good," but Russell thinks this position untenable.
"Goodness," then, he seems to regard as an intrinsic quality
which may attach to a thing regardless of persons, opinions, or
the things so designated. It is a sort of Platonic idea * "laid
hi lo so p hi cal assays, pp. 1-58.
2Ibid., pp. 7-10.
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up in heaven," which at tachea to those things that are "good.*
Tnis •good" is the and toward which conduct aims. It is some-
thing apart from the personal judgment of it. In that sense it
is impersonal. If it is impersonal it is thus separated from
desires and impulses, which are personal, and must mean that it
is object ire in the same sense in which we have seen that Russell
holds logical abstractions to be the only objective realities.
The terms "right* and "wrong" are applied to conduct, but
"the notion of good is wider and more fundamental than any no-
tion of conduct."1 There are two methods of judging actions.
One, the utilitarian, "judges the rightness of an act by relation
to the goodness or badness of its consequences." The other,
the int uitionist , "judges by the approval or disapproval of the
moral sense Of conscience." Regarding these two views Russell
says, "I believe that it is necessary to combine both theories
in order to get a complete account of right and wrong."2 He
then proceeds to make a distinction between subjective and ob-
jective rightness. "The moral sense," referred to by the int ui-
tionist, he says, "consists in a certain specific emotion of
approval towards an act." Thus an act is subjectively right
if the agent experiences a feeling of approval when he performs
the act* The difficulty here is that conscience may sometimes
be mistaken in what it approves, if the act is judged by conse-
quences. There is a sense in which a thing is judged right other
tha$ that it is merely approved, and this is objective, in that
^■Ibid. , p. 5.
2Ibid., p. 15.
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it does not depend merely upon opinions and feelings. Thus an
act which is subjectively right may Toe objectively wrong, since
conscience approves the act, but the consequences show it to be
wrong. This means that "objective" right ness must be judged from
the standpoint of consequences. We should strive to train our-
selves to give approval to things we believe objectively right,
thus training the conscience to approve what is objectively right,
and bringing subjective and objective Tightness into agreement
with each other. The wisest action is the one that will on the
whole probably have the best consequenoes. ^ From these conclu-
the terms .
sions Russell comes to uBeA moral .and immoral to refer to the
subjective aspect of an act, and the terms right and wrong to
refer to the objective aspects of conduct as judged by conse-
quences. An act is moral when it is what the agent judges ob-
jectively right after sufficient consideration; and it is right
when of all possible acts it will probably get the best results.
Regardless of what determinists say, Russell thinks that
occasions do arise where several alternatives present themselves,
and "it is certain that we can both do which we choose, and
choose which we will. In this sens© , all the alternatives are
possible. What determinism maintains is, that our wi 11 to choose
this or that alternative is the effect of antecedents; but this
does not prevent our will from being itself a cause of other ef-
fects."2 Morality, he claims, depends upon the assumption that
volitions have causes, otherwise it would be useless to attempt
^Ibid., pu.21-34.
2Ibid., p. 37.
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to influence the conduct of others. If causality played no
part in human conduct, we could never be sure of anyone.
Russell rejects egoism as an adequate oasis for establish-
ing the "good" toward which our conduct should aim* He thinks
the theory that a man will serve the general good best by serv-
ing his own good is refuted by common experience, since egoism
cannot be maintained, he concludes that "we ought to pursue the
general good, and when this conflicts with self-interest, self-
interest ought to -give way."-1,
Russsll thinks that the differences of opinion as to moral
judgments regarding the same thing could be largely removed by
more adequate consideration of the facts involved. The philoso-
pher often falls into error through trying to construct a system,
and the moralist tends to become absorbed in the consideration
of mearf-»-actions--rather than in the ends of conduct, which
should be his chief interest.2 Ideas of what is good or bad
do not vary as much as ideas of right and wrong which apply to
conduct, and conduct varies in different circumstances, even
though the same end may be in view. We often confuse means and
ends in considering conduct also. In considering ends we should
view them as a whole. The value of a complex whole cannot be
measured by adding together the values of the parts. "Tne whole
is often better or worse than the sum or the values of its parts,"
and "many goods must be estimated as wholes, not piecemeal; and
exactly the same applies to evils."'
^•Ibid., p. 49.
2Ibid.. pp. 52 - 53.
3Ibid., p. 54.
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This statement regarding the value of who lea appears to
be a direct contradiction of the analytic method which Russell
advocates as the proper method to "be used in philosophy.1 it
also implies the objectivity of values, and is a surprising
conclusion for a scientific analytic materialist, who elsewhere
finds no place for values in the system of nature.
He concludes this study of ethics with the thought that
the greater part of the differences in ethical views are due
to mistaking means for ends, or to the influence of some "hasty
theory" in falsifyling immediate judgments. Clearer thinking
should result in more agreement, which is probably the chief
benefit of studying ethics, he thinks.
Russell appears to have forgotten his theory long enough
to recognize that values do have some objective meaning in the
world. Does he later sacrifice this decision in the interests
of his theory? Perhaps his should not be termed a "hasty" the-
ory, but it appears that he does sacrifice many of the values
of experience in the interests of a logical theory, thus fall-
ing into the very error which, as we have noted above, he con-
demns in other philosophers on ethical subject s.^
B. His Leaning Toward Subjectivism in Kis Later Outlook.
When we turn to the essay on "Mysticism and Logic" we find
Russell maintaining that good and evil are subjective matters.-5
Mysticism and Logic, p. 113. Also of. p. 16 above.
215t^°pkL°*i ®!2*Z5> Pt). 52- 53. Also cf. p. 21 above.
5Mystioism and Logic, pp« 1-32.
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"What is good is merely that towards which we have one kind of
feeling, and what is evil is merely that towards which we have
another kind of feeling,"1 Ethical interest is simply the "hope
of satisfaction to our human desires. .The difference between
a good world and a had one is a difference in the particular
characteristics of the particular things that exist in these
worlds.1*2 This difference attaches to things only from the
standpoint of our personal desires, not from the standpoint of
the things themselves, nor the philosophic view of them. The
scientific attitude seeks only the facts, without regard to
ethical considerations. "Philosophy has seldom sought or achieved
ethical neutrality, while the spirit of science is " submission, "
which is likely to achieve the best ethical results. "The good
which it concerns us to remember is the good which it lies in
our power to ere ate --the good in our own lives and in our atti-
tude towards the world."3
Russell now attempts to make ethics entirely a subjective
affair, yet declares there is a "good which lies in our power to
create." Once a good is created, does it not become objective?
Does it not become one of the terms to which other terms fee come
related? If it is held to be but a relation between myself and
something in the world, it is still real, since relations are
among the fundamental realities, according to Russ411* He main-
tains further, as stated above, that the scientific attitude
^bid., p. 27.
2Ibid. , p. 29.
3Ibid., p. 31.
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seeks only the facts. If this "good which. ... concerns us" is
a fact then science must be able to deal with it, which means
that it is objectively real, but if it is not a fact, then how
can it concern us?
It should further be noted that in thus making good speci-
fic and personal, he is taking a Dosition in direct opposition
to his contention in "The Elements of Ethics" that good is
general and impersonal which we have already no ted. ^
In the essay, "On Scientific Method in Philosophy," he says,
"All ethics, however refined, remains more or less subjecti ve . . . "2
One wonders just how ethics can be "more or less subjective"
without also being more or less objective. If it is only partial-
ly subjective then it must also be partially objective. However,
it seems evident that Russell is trying to make ethics merely a
subjective personal matter, depending entirely upon feeling and
de si re .
C. The Ethics of Desire and the Good Life.
1. Man1 8 Relation to Eature and the Place of Values*
In a little book entitled, What I. Believe , Russell sets
forth desire as the basis for whatever ethical notions we have.
In the first place, we should note that "Man is a part of Hature,
not something contrasted with Nature."3 Then, "The philosophy
*Cf. p. 18 above,
^Mysticism and Logic, pp. 108-109*
^What I Believe, p. 1.
of nature is one thing, the philosophy of value is quite another.
Nothing but harm can come of confusing them, fhat we think good,
what we should like, has no bearing whatever upon what is, which
is the question for the philosophy of nature."1 The result is
that, though we are children of nature, "everything, real or
imagined, can be appraised by us, and there is no outside stan-
dard to show that our valuation is wrong. We are ourselves the
ultimate and irrefutable arbiters of value, and in the world of
value Nature is only a part."-2 In the world of values we tran-
scend nature, but "In the world of values, Nature in itself is
neutral, neither good nor bad, deserving neither admiration nor
censure. It is we who create value, and our desires which con-
fer value."2
- Thus it appears that man, though the child of nature, is
able to create something apart from nature and not the product
of it, yet to which nature and with it himself is amenable.
Truly, this is logic "fearfully and wonderfully made." It
seems to be dualism, pure but not simpls.
2* Philosophical Development of the Ethics of Desire.
a. Ethics and Morals Contrasted and Defined.
In a chapter on "Ethics" in his book entitled Philosophy,
Russell has set forth in the most complete form that I have found
the process of thought by which he has arrived at his "Ethics of
xIbid. , p. 14.
2Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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Desire." He claims that ethics should furnish the principles
from which to deduce the rules of conduct which belong to morals.
Moral rules vary in different ages and among different races and
nations to a surprising degree. "But ethics is concerned with
something more general than moral rules, and less subject to
change • " 1
When some one says: "You ought to do so-and-so"or " I ought
to do so-and-so," there is in the thought an "emotional content"
which means "this is the act towards which I feel the emotion
of approval*" But we want "something more objective and systema-
tic and constant than a personal emotion," so we must examine
the reasons which are given for the claim that we "ought" to
approve certain things* He points out that the ancients, So-
crates, flato, and Aristotle, all dealt extensively with ethics,
but "*..the subject has not yet proved amenable to exact reason-
ing, and we cannot boast that the moderns have as yet rendered
their predecessors obsolete."2 One is rather thankful that he
makes this admission.
In his somewhat earlier book', What £ Believe , Russell main-
tains that the "ought" element of experience is the urge to do
what society dictates we should do. It is the impulse toward
social behavior* "What we 'ought' to desire ia merely what
someone else wishes us to desire*"3 It is worth noticing that
we do not always give our own emotional approval to what society
Philosophy, pp. 22 5-226.
2Ibid. , TDp. 226-227*
sWhat I Believe, pr>. 29-30.
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demands. Apparently Russell has not reached definite conclusions
about the "ought" experience.
b. Theories Regarding Virtue.
Russell thinks that in the beginning virtue consisted in
obedience to some authority, religious, political, or social.
The people of one community tend to universalize the code of
moral rules which they accept, and think them proper for every-
one, everywhere. Any age or nation having different customs,
is condemned. This view holds that "there are certain rules of
conduct--^. the Decalogue --which determine virtue in all
situations*" Russell thinks there are several objections to
this view however, the first of which is that "the rules can
hardly cover the whole field of human conduct." If anything is
a "moral issue" we will have our course dictated for us by the
rule, "regardless of consequences, " while in other matters we
we will have to consider the consequences. This results prac-
tically in having two codes, which is unsatisfactory. The second
objection is that " a code of conduct which takes no account of
circumstances" will sometimes have desirable, and sometimes un-
desirable consequences. The third objection is that we cannot
telljwhich codes of rules to adopt. It is usually claimed that
each of various codes is known by "revelation and tradition,"
but there is nothing to show which revelation is correct, except
personal interest. "Thus W3 are driven to abandon the attempt
to define virtue by means of a set of rules of conduct. "I
Philosophy, dp. 227-228.
C5
-28-
There 1b another form of this view which holds that "no
matter how moral cojss may differ, a man should always obey that
of his own time and place and creed." Thus a Mohammedan would
not be condemned for practicing polygamy anywhere- , but an Eng-
lishman would be condemned no matter where he lived, Russell
says this view "makes social conformity the essence of virtue;
or, as with Hegel, regards virtue as obedience to government,"
This might work well, he thinks, in an autocracy, but not in
democratic countries.1
It may be more nearly correct to "define right conduct by
the motive or state of mind of the agent?" Thus, "acts inspired
by love are good, and those inspired by hate are bad." Practi-
cally Russell holds this is right, but philosophically it is
"deducible from something more fundamental."'* In this view I
suppose Russell would include Kant's doctrine of the good will,
but Russell does not consider it satisfactory, because it takes
no account of consequences, as we shall see.
He points out that none of the views thus far considered
judge conduct by its "consequences." THe utilitarian philosophy,
which makes consequences the standard of judgment, maintains
that "happiness is the good, and that we ought to act so as to
maximise the balance of happiness over unhappiness in the world."
Russell does not think happiness is adequate as a definition of
"the good," but does agree that "conduct ought to be judged by
its consequences." For this reason, he thinks the moral code
XIbid. , pp. 22 8-229.
2Ibid., p. 229.
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should be changed whenever necessary to make it serve the public
good.1 Here he appears once more to take an objective attitude
toward the "good." Sven though conduct should be judged by con-
sequences, he thinks there is a specific "good" which should be
sought. It is strange that Russell does not see how he objec-
tifies values practically, though he ref uses to do so theoreti-
cally.
c. How We Find the "Good."
We must now see "what constitutes the ends of right con-
duct." Russell says that he formerly held that there are cer-
tain general propositions about what is "good," which are known
a priori i but that he now thinks that "good and bad are deriva-
tive from desire." He does not merely mean that the "good is
the desired," for desires conflict, and "good is... .mainly a
social concept, designed to find an issue from the conflict."
There will be conflicting desires, not siiitply between groups,
but within the experience of a solitary individual. If one acts
on the desire that is strongest at the moment, then other desires
which are thought better in the long run, may be defeated. This
conflict must be solved by the use of intelligence, and if there
is a desire for a harmonious life, then desires consistent with
eq,ch other must be encouraged.**
When people live together int society, more desires conflict,
and a neutral authority is necessary to attempt to harmonize them.
^Loc cit .
2Ibid., pp. 230-231.
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Sometimes this authority seeks to bring internal harmony within
a group by creating "esprit de corse, public spirit, patriotism,
etc." which directs quarrelsome impulses, toward some outside
group. This is a "partial and external" method, however, not
likely to have satisfactory consequences in the long run.
It may be argued that more happiness can be derived from
love than from hate, but Russell thinks this is not always true.
Tor instance, many people got much satisfaction from hating the
Germans during the war. For this reason he holds that the most
important moral standards "cannot be inculcated from a personal
-point of view, but only from the point of view of a neutral
authority." Therefore he claims that "ethics is mainly social."
The neutral authority must seek to inculcate and develop
desires that will be compatible for tha greatest harmony within
the grouo, that is, those that are "socially preferable." "Our
desires are a product of three factors; native disposition,
education, and present circumst ances»" Russell declares. The
first we know but little how to deal with. The third is opera-
tive in an external way through the law, ecnomic motives, social
praise and blame, etc., "not by creating good desires, but by
producing a conflict of greed and fear in which it is hoped that
fear will win." The second factor, education, is the really
vital method of training and changing men's desires, "so that
they act spontaneously in a social fashion."**
Jlbid., ff. 231-233.
2Ibid., p, 233.
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What a man doe a is mora important than what he feela, from
the standpoint of eociety, "out it is impoaaible to cause a man
to do the right thing consistently unleoe he haa the right de-
sire a. nl One cannot have right de aires fey simply praising them
or wishing to have them. Exhortation or teaching of specific
moral rules is not sufficient to make people mojr»i, Russell thinks.
They must be taught to desire the right things.
d. The Supreme Moral Rule of the Ethics of Desire.
Russell now defines "good" and "had" more explicitly.
"Primarily, we call something •good' when we desire it,
and 'bad1 when we have an aversion from it. But our use of
words is more constant than our desires, and therefore we
shall continue to call a thing gooa even at moments when we
are not actually desiring it ... .Moreover the uae of words is
social, and therefore we learn only to call a thing good,
except in rare circumstances, if most of the people we asso-
ciate with are also willing to call it goo<*« Thus 'good'
comes to apply to things desired by the whole of a social
group. It is evident, therefore, that there can be more
good in a world wheie the desires of different individuals
harmonize than in one where they conflict. The supreme moral
rule should, therefore, be: Act so jib to, produce harmonious
rather than dia cord ant desires*"^""
To accomplish this end, social institutions should be such
as to cause as little conflict of interests as possible between
different individuals or groups, and individuals should be edu-
cated so as, to have harmonious desires both within themselves,
and with those of their neighbors*5
If we seek harmonious desires, thsn "love is better than
Ibid., pp. 233-234.
Ibid., p. 234.
'Loc. cit.
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hate, since, when two people love each other, both can be satis-
fied, whereas when they hate each other one at most can achieve
the object of his desire." We should encourage the desire for
knowledge, for knowledge can be shared by all. The desire for
property, or for power, are causes of conflict, however, since
only a few can satisfy them. Respect for the rights of others,
and impulses toward personal achievement in the creation of
works of art or in scientific investigation should be developed
by education. Where desires are harmonious, knowledge is good;
but where desires conflict, knowledge may be very dangerous.
This leads Russell to declare that "The conclusion may be summed
up in a single phrase: The good life is one inspired by love and
ftVided by. knowledge."1
This brings us directly to a consideration of the "Good
Life" which Russell sets forth in a chapter under that title
in What I_ Believe.
3. The Good Life.
Russell's view is, as stated above, that "The good life is
ope tnapi rad by love and guided by_ knowledge .* He holds that
"neither love without knowledge, nor knowledge without love can
produce a good life." He cites as an /lexanple of love without
knowledge, the gathering of people to pray for relief from a
pestilence, thus spreading the infection; and as an example of
Jlbid., *.235.
*Loc. cit. Also What I Believe, p. 20.
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knowledge without love, the use of science for destruction of
life in the World War. "Although both love and knowledge are
necessary, love is in a sense more fundamental, since it will
lead intelligent people to seek knowledge, in order to find out
how to benefit those whom they love."1
a* Meaning of Love*
By love Russell means the emotion of love, which is genuine
interest, as constrasted with the principle of benevolence which
is "a pale emotion nine parts humbug."2 Benevolence, however,
seems the best word he can find to denote the desire for the
welfare of others. Love is a combination of delight and well-
wishing. "Delight without well-wishing may be cruel; well-wish-
ing without delight easily tends to become cold and a little
superior."3
In a perfect world we might love every being but in our
actual world it is impossible to feel delight in some things,
wrich we find disgusting. "Eot to mention human beings, there
are fleas and bugs and lice."4 One cannot feel "wholly benevo-
lent" toward a rival lover. Delight must be an ingredient of
the best love, but it is selective, and compromises with bene-
volence will be necessary, since "instinct has its rights, and
if we do violence to it beyond a point it takes vengeance in
subtle ways*"5 We must always take account of human limitations,
which makes knowledge necessary.
*Ibid., p. 21
2Ibid., pp. 22-23.
3 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
4Ibid., p. 26.
5Ibid., p. 28.
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b. Meaning of Knowledge*
By knowledge, Russell means the sort of knowledge science
gives rather than what is commonly called ethical knowledge,
for, he says, "I do not think there is, strictly speaking, such
a thing as ethical knowledge." The Tightness or wrongness of
a given course of conduct must be decided by "reference to its
probable consequences." Sciwnce should determine how to achieve
whatever ends are de sired. 1
Rules of conduct must be tested by consequences, that is,
whether they realize desired ends. When we say we "ought" to
desire certain ends, we are simply recognizing social pressure,
for "That we 'ought' to desire is merely what someone else wishes
us to desire." The feeling that one "ought" to do something,
then, is just the pressure of custom and convention, which in-
fluenced our behavior through desire for approval and fear of
disapproval.*
Suppose your child is ill. "Love makes you wish to cure it,
and science tells you how to do so." You do not pause to prove
it is better to cure the child. "Your act springs directly from
desire for an end, together with knowledge of means." The same
principle operates in regard to all our conduct* In some cases
our knowledge is more adequate to accomplish a desired end than
in others* We cannot make people do what they do not wish to do,
however. "What is possible is to alter their desires by a system
of rewards and penalties, among which social approval and
^•Ibid., pp. 29-30.
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disapproval are not the least potent ... .Outside of human desires
there is no moral standard."1
4, Desire as the Easis of Ethics and the Good Life.
Russell contends that the only difference between ethical
knowledge and scientific knowledge is that ethical knowledge
consists in knowing whatever facts are necessary to accomplish
the fulfillment of 'our desires. So, he argues, "what distin-
guishes ethics from science is not any special kind of knowledge,
but merely desire. The knowledge required in ethics is exactly
like the knowledge elsewhere; what is peculiar is that certain
ends are desired, and right conduct is what conduces to them."2
In a sense, then, ethical knowledge must also be scientific, and
the more proof we have that a certain kind of conduct will achieve
the desired ends, the better ethical knowledge it is. It seems
to follow, then, that the best ethical knowledge would be the
most purely scientific. The only standard to decide our course
of conduct, once we have learned what ends can be attained by
certain courses of conduct, which might be a matter for science
to determine, is our desire. Having decided what ends we 4esire,
we then merely choose the course of conduct that will attain those
ends.
The effectiveness of an ethical argument, therefore, lies in
the amount of scientific proof that can be adduced to show that
a given course of conduct will attain the desired ends* But
1Ibid., pp. 31-32.
2Ibid. , p. 32.
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desire remains the standard that determines what ends we shall
choose, and ethical education "consists in strengthening certain
desires and weakening others."^
Although Russell thinks that desire is the basis of all
ethics, and that it furnishes the only moral standard in attain-
ing the "good life," I think that in the "good life" itself he
sets a standard for the desires to achieve. I shall try to bring
this out in the course of my criticism which follows.
5. Criticism of Russell^ Ethics of Desire.
When desire is declared to be basis of right conduct, it
seems to me that the question still remains as to how we shall
determine what are the right desires* A standard is needed, for
desires are personal things, and they never stand off for us to
look at them. It is a very easy matter for us to deceive our-
selves into believing our purposes are altruistic, even though
at root they are selfish, when we desire something very much.
If the desires are to be guided by the training society gives
through approval and disapproval, then social custom and conven-
tion must have a large part in determining our aims, but this is
a heteronomous influence, and, as we shall see presently, Russell
is much opposed to it.
There appears to be another danger too. When Russell con-
tends that the only difference between ethical knowledge and
scientific knowledge is that ethical knowledge is what shows how
^bid., p. 33.
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to achieve the desired enda, he identifies much scientific know-
ledge as also ethical, for, he says, "The whole effectiveness of
any ethical argument lies in its scientific part, i. e. in the
proof that one kind of conduct, rather than some others, is a means
to an end which is widely desired.*1 This may lead to the theory
that the "end Justifies the means." It has "beer, noted that Russell
doe3 not mean "quite simply that the good is the desired," and he
recognizes that one cannot act merely on impulses that happen to "be
strongest at the moment, for this might result in defeating other
desires that are stronger in the long run.2 However, if the know-
ledge of how to achieve desired ends is to he regarded as coldly -
scientific fact, not to be evaluated ethically, then it is logical
to follow the principle thet the end justifies the means. But this
maxim cannot be maintained if the means are likely to produce nana
that over-balances the good of the end in view. 3
Russell would probably answer that all conduct must be judged
by its probable consequences,4 and would contend that if the con-
duct involved in attaining a desired end had undesirable consequen-
ces then the means of achieving it should be changed, or the end
abandoned. If, however, the end in view is held to be sufficiently
desirable, or the desire for that end is sufficiently strong in the
long run, then it is likely to follow that the means involved will
be disregarded, especially if there seems to be no other means
pLoc. cit.
Philosophy, pp. 230-231.
3Everett, Moral Values , pp. 57 - 58.
4Vhat I Believe, pp. 29-30.
-38-
to attain the desired ends* On the basis of desire there is no
other standard than the desire, and if it is sufficiently strong,
it will naturally override whatever stands in its way.
Perhaps Russell would say that this difficulty is removed
by educating the desires, which, as we have seen, he thinks,
"consists in strengthening certain desires and weakening others."
But there must he sorae standard to determine what desires are to
be strengthened and what ones weakened. In this regard, Russell
say 8, "I desire to see approval given to behavior likely to real-
ize social purposes which we desire and disapproval to opposite
behavior."1 Prom this it appears that "social purposes" might
be taken as the standard, and the means of altering the desires
of people so as to conform to this standard is "by a system of
rewards and penalties, among which social approval and disapproval
are not the least potent."2 But in the process of education of
the desires to achieve the desired "social purposes," some one
must determine what these "social purposes" are, and what desires
will achieve them, and also what "system of rewards and penalties"
will result in developing the proper desires. If "social approval
and disapproval" are to be recognized as "not the least potent"
and used, then it means that the desire for social approval is
thought to be one of the strongest desires and is used accordingly.
What is this but desiring "merely what someone else wishes us to
desire?"5 Yet this is just what Russell says "ought" means, and
he condemns the "ought" experience as merely the pressure of
^bid., p. 30.
2Ibid., pp. 31-32*
3Ibid.» p. 29.
(
t t t
t
t
t 4
-39-
' authority, convention, and custom, and thinks it should have no
place in ethical considerations* However, the ethics of desire,
which he advocates, is to he judged and enforced "by exactly the
same standards and methods of social approval and disapproval,
that is, largely through custom and convention. Whether it be
called "ought" or the desire for realization of "social purposes,"
it has the same ur-ge underlying it in the experience of the in-
dividual person, and a large part of that urge is due to "social
approval and disapproval." It seems as though the "ought" which
Russell threw so unceremoniously "out the window" has quite cere-
moniously walked back in "by the door," dressed in a new garb.
Though Russell contends that "outside of human desires there
is no moral standard, "^ we have noted that he practically re-
cognizes "social purposes" as the standard for judging conduct.
This is after all much the same object that is aimed at in the
standards set by custom and convention which a person receives
from the social group, and which are enforced by a system of re-
wards and penalties, or social approval and disapproval. His
standard is not as new as he thinks it is, except that he would
by
have the "social purposes" determined^scientif i c means rather
than the more haphazard methods society has used in the past.
He has placed the motive power urging us toward conformity
to those standards that society dictates we should adopt in the
desires gather than in the voice of conscience, commonly inter-
preted as the "ought" experience. He has given us another
XIbid. , p. 32.
-40-
interpretation of human experience that he thinks more scientific,
hut which we cannot be sure is really any closer to the facts
than is the other. It may be that it satisfies a materialist,
who refuses to recognize the integrity of the self in psychology,
better than the older interpretation of the experience of obli-
gation, but in his attitude Russell displays much the same dogma-
tism, which he condemns so enthusiastically in others*
Russell would no doubt say that if conduct is "inspired by
love," then love would prevent one from indulging in a desire
which knowledge showed would have bad "consequences.* This
seems to me inadequate, however, since a desire for some selfish
end or for something for someone else may be "insDired by love"
for oneself or another and, if the desire is strong enough,
knowledge may seek the fulfillment of that desire at the expense
of everything else. Here again the end might easily be thought
to justify the means. There seems to "tee no guarantee that the
desire for realization of "social purposes" would be any stronger
from this point of view than from that of Kant who held that a
good act is one inspired by the "good will." After all, I do
not see that there is likely to be any difference between con-
a
dract inspired by love or byAgood will.
It appear 8 to me that there is just as likely to be good
"consequences" from acting from a "good will" which regards every
person as an end in himself, as from acting from desire even
in
though "inspired by love," since^the latter case it may be much
easier to regard some people as means to be used in the attain-
ment of the desired ends.
id to
-41-
The love that Rusaell means, noted above, is the personal emo-
tion of love, whi ch, unless universalized, is apt to partake of all
the selfishness that personal love may involve* If it is univer-
salized it becomes benevolence or good will, of which Russell i3
distrustful, though he admits th*t it is a necessary element in
love* This universalized love may be very similar to the attitude
of Kant's good will. The physical sensations of love, such as the
the "delight " which Russell mentions, will be lacking in good will,
but otherwise the differences of attitude may not be great. To say
that an act is "inspired by love" does not seem very different from
saying that it is the product of "Good Will." ^rhaps Russell is
not as far from Kant in principle as he thinks he is.
Desire must no doubt play an important part in any ethics of
value, as Prof. Sverett has pointed out,1 but to declare that
"outside of human desires there is no moral standard," as Russell
does, seems to be surrendering to the maxim of "every man for him-
self." In The J^n^uejrt of Happiness Russell makes consistency and
harmony the standard for desire, but this does not solve the prob-
lem, for one's dssires may be utterly consistent and harmonious for
an antisocial end. Desires are unstable individual impulses, the
product of instinct and environment for the most part, rather than
reason. Russell would have them trained for "social purposes," but
this is setting up a standard outside of desire itself. Desires
are the driving power of conduct to a large extent, but without
ideals in life to set a standard for the desires to aim at, we
have nothing to differentiate a good life from a bad one.
^W. G. Everett, Moral Values, p. 181.
t <
c
(
It seems that, despite the fact that he claims there
is no moral standard outside of desires, Russell has really set
up an ideal standard int his conception of the "good life." He
intends that the "good life" shall be the desired. It is achieved
through "love," which is an attitude of personal interest and
desire for general Sell-being, guided by the best knowledge for
the accomplishment of "social purposes." Here is a standard
outside of the desires, which the desires should be trained to
accept. After all, it does not seem that this is very far from
the standard of universalized good will, as set forth by Kant.
Russell also recognizes many ideal values of life which
should be achieved to make life good, which really set standards
for conduct. So in practice Russell appears to be quite incon-
sistent with his claim that there is no moral standard outside
desire. The one place where he seems really to follow the prin-
ciple of le3ire more clearly than anywhere alse is in the matter
of sex. One might almost think that sex has no "social purposes."
We shall consider his attitude on sex a little further on.
D. Moral Codes and Conventional Morality.
1. "Place of Moral Codes.
Russell recognizes the need and place for moral rules and
codes. In one of his early essays he says, "The importance of
precepts such as the Ten Commandments lies in the fact that they
are simple rules, obedience to which will in almost all cases
c
r
C
-43-
have be.tter consequences than disobedience."^
Later he declares, "The practical need of morals arises
from the conflict of desires, whether of different people or of
the same person at different times or even at one time."** He
holds that Bentham's principle of "enlightened self-interest"
is not satisfactory, because prudence may lead to cruelty toward
othersi though "prudence is a part of the good life."3 Moral
codes furnish "a method of enabling men to live together in a
oommunity in spite of the possibility that their desires may
conflict."4 Methods of applying codes vary. There is the method
of the criminal law, which inflicts disagreeable consequences
for undesirable acts; and the method of social censure. Sut
Russell thinks there is "another method, more fundamental, and
far more satisfactory when it succeeds* This is to alter men's
cnaracter3 and desires in such a way as to minimize occasions of
conflict by making the success of one man's desires as far as
possible consistent with that of another's." Thus love is better
than hate, for "two people between whom there is love succeed or
fail together, but when two people hate each other the success 01
either is the failure of the other. "w
All moral codes should be examined, Russell thinks, to see
whether they are "such as wisdom and benevolence would have de-
creed."6 He finds much that is both unwise and sadly lacking in
Philosophical B 8 says, p« 20.
*What I Be^Ueve , p. 35.
^Ibid,, o. 35.
flbid., r>. 37.
^Ibid., o. 38.
*Ibid., jfp. 39.
-44-
"benevolence in our conventional morality of sex and marriage,
and in education and the state. Much of the difficulty he
"blames on religious superstition and on the superstition of
nationalism.^-
He "believes that "moral rules ought not to be such as to
make instinctive happiness impossible
2. His Criticism of Conventional Morality.
Russell began to "be critical of conventional morality in
hi 8 early ethical writings, where he declares, "Most conventional
coles embody some degree of unwarrantable selfishness, individual,
prof sssional, or national, and are thus in certain respects wor-
thy of detestation. "3 This point of view grows with the years.
In the essay entitled, "On the Value of Scepticism," he holds
that for the most part, actions are due to habits rather than
beliefs, though our most important actions are associated with
"beliefs. However, beliefs are seldom based on evidence, but
upon selfish motives which are unconscious, ani for which we in-
vent reasons. Shrewdness is unconscious reason working for our
own interests.4 The impulses which further oar lives and the
lives of others include "the joy of life, and love, and art,
which is psychologically an offshoot of love." Tne lower impul-
ses of the instinctive life inolude "competition, patriotism,
and war." Conventional morality does everything to discourage
*Ibid. , pp. 40-54.
-Ibid., p* 50,
fohilosophigal laaaxa, ^. 22.
4 Sceptical Bssays, pp. 11-25.
-45-
ths first group of impulses and to encourage the second group.
"True morality wouli do the exaot opposite." We may trust the
care of those whom we lore to instinct; "but not so those whom
we hate. Those not of our group are apt to "be conceived abstract-
ly, and we are likely to persuade ourselves that even acts moti-
vated "by hatred really have a lofty motive, though it may be sel-
fish. Russell declares further:
"Only a large measure of scepticism can tear away the veils
which hide the truth from us. Having achieved that, we could
begin to guild a new morality, not based on envy and restric-
tion, but on the wish for a full life and the realization that
other beings are a help and not a hindrance when once the mad-
ness of envy has been cured. This is not a Utopian hope; it
was partially realized in Elizabethan England. It could
be realized to-morrow if men would learn to pursue their own
happiness rather than the misery of others. This is no im-
possible austere morality; yet its adoption would turn our
earth into a paradise."1
In the essay on "Dreams and Facts" he holds that beliefs
are the outgrowth of desires, and are usually wholly irrational*
Belief 8 are day dreams, often dispelled by discovery of facts. 2
In an ironical essay, entitled, "The Harm that Good Men
Do,"3 Russell upholds Bentham's utilitarianism against Kant.
He says that Kant's view is that all virtue must be inspired by
the moral law, ani not by affection for the person affected.
This is obviously unfair to Kant, for he insisted that every
person should always be treated as an end, never as a means.
According to current ideas, Russell continues, virtue is simply
conformity to conventional ideas of "goodness," or what custom
says "ought" to be. The convent ionally "good" man may not make
•Sceptical Sssays,,. pp. 24-2 5.
2Ibid. , op. 25-35.
3Ibid., po. 111-123.
anyone happier; and the conventionally "Dai" man may do much
good. He concludes that *a good man is one whose opinions and
activities are pleasing to the holders of power." That is, a
"good" man in what Russell regards as the conventional sense.
A few sentences casting further light upon his point of
view follow: "The standards of goodness' which are generally
recognized "by public opinion are not those which are calculated
to make the world a happier place." This he claims is due to
tradition and "the unjust power of dominant classes. "I
"Current ethic is a curious mixture of superstition and
rationalism." Our virtue is negative; it" consists in not doing
rather than in doing." Love is positive; the Gospel precept to
"love thy neighbor as thyself" is positive.2
Russell says Bentham advocated, as the basis of morals,
"The greatest happiness of the greatest number," but those who
seek it are persecuted. He continues, "We need a morality based
upon love of life, upon pleasure in growth and positive achieve-
ment, not upon repression and prohibition. A man should be re-
garded as fgoodf if he is happy, expansive, generous, and glad
when others are happy; if so, a few peccadillos should be re-
garded as of little import ance ."3
Thus we see how thoroughly disgusted Russell has become
with our conventional morality, and goes to extremes in oppos-
ing it.
1Ibid., p, 119.
2Ibid., "o • jUl.
3Ibid., t> • 122.
-47-
a. Superstition in Conventional Morality,
▼e hare just noted that Russell condemns much current
morality as a* curio us mixture of superstition and rationalism."
He makes a strong case for his charges of superstition. Else-
where he declares, "Current morality is a curious "blend of
utilitarianism and superstit ion, but the superstitious part has
the stronger hold, as is natural, 3ince superstition is the
origin of moral rules."1 This is because primitive peoples
thought certain acts displeasing to the gois, and that the doing
of these acts would bring punishment upon the whole community.
Anyone who displeased a god committed sin, and since the whole
community might be involved in the consequences of the sin, it
was to the interest of all that he should atone for it. This
led to belief in superstitions, and the individual who would not
conform to superstitious customs was a threat to the community,
according to their belief, and should be punished or destroyed.
However, the man of scientific outlook will examine all
acts considered sinful to see whether they do any harm. "And
he will find that especially in what concerns sex, our current
morality contains a very great deal of which the origin is purely
superstitious-" "People have large families, though they cannot
supoort them prooerly, because superstition dictates that they
should. While nursing mothers and children are starving for
milk, he asserts:
^What I Belie v.e , pp. 39-40.
^Ibid., p. 41.
5Ibid., pt>. 42-43.
-48-
-T>ublic authorities will spend vast sums on paving rich
residential districts where there is little traffic. They
must know that in taking this decision they are condemning
a certain number of working-class children to death for the
crime of poverty. Yet the ruling party are supported by the
immense majority of ministers of religion, who, with the ^ope
at their head, hare pledged the vast forces of superstition
throughout the world to the support of social injustice."1
Here we get an inkling of Russell1 s point of view and the reason
he is so bitter against much of our conventional morality and
conventional religion as found in the churches.
He blames superstition for much evil in our educational
systems. Many things are not taught that children should learn
because of superstition, especially in matters regarding sex. 2
Superstition, combined with economic reasons, leads to imposing
unmarried teachers upon children.3 Clergymen, he thinks, are
the worst teachers of morals, for "they condemn acts which do no
harm and they condone acts which do great harm."4 This is es-
pecially true as regards sexual relations, and the encouraging
of large families. Superstition is the cause of the lack of
sex-education. ^ -
He finds one thing even more harmful than theological super-
stition, and that is "the superstition of nationalism, of duty
to one*s own State and to -no other."
Another place where society suffers from superstitious mor-
ality is in the treatment accorded to criminals. "The view that
criminals a^re 'wicked* and ^deserve' punishment is not one which
AIbid., pr). 44-45.
2lbid., p. 45.
3lbid., p. 46.
4lbid., p. 47.
Slbid., pp. 4T-51.
6Ibid., p. 51.
-49-
a rational morality can support. "•*■ Society must try to prevent
people from doing certain things, of which murder is an example,
"but if two methods are "equally effective in preventing murder,
the one involving least harm to the murderer is to be preferred."
The criminal is a sick part of society and needs curative treat-
ment, not merely punishment. Harm to the murderer is regrettable,
but sometimes may be necessary. However, "the vindictive feeling
called 'moral indignation1 is merely a form of cruelty. Suffer-
ing to the criminal can never be justified by the notion of vin-
dictive punishment. If education combined with kindness is
equally effective, it is to be preferred; still more is it to be
2
preferred if it is more effective,"
Elsewhere, Russell , de clares that primitive morality grew
out of the taboo, purely superstitious, which forbade harmless
acts through fear of magical power. The prohibition of murder,
for example, was originally due to superstitious fear of the
murdered man's blood (ghost). It was thought that blood guilti-
ness could be removed by ceremony, whence came the idea of re-
pentance as the "washing out" of guilt.3 In the same way many
other moral ideas that are current originated in superstition,
b. Fear as a Disruptive Force in Moral Life,
Time and again Russell inveighs against fear as one of the
most destructive elements in our lives, Fear is at the root of
4bid. , p. 52.
2Ibid., p, 53.
3Scegtical Ss.aay.s_, pp. 119-120,
-50-
muoh that is evil in our conventional morality. He finds fear
at the root of much malevolence in society. Many people have
"a haunting fear of ruin,'1 or "that they will lose their job
or their health," or a great many other things, most of which
never come to pas*."1' "The frantic pursuit of security" leads
to hatred, cruelty, and war. Russell has summed up the case
against fear in a recent article2 in which he deolares that fear
and hatred are at the bottom of war and international anarchy.
He traoes many of our difficulties, both individual , and social,
to fear. The love of power and desire for possession in econo-
mic and political relations and in sexual morals, he finds are
rooted in fear. Education which inculcates some orthodoxy in-
stead of teaching pupils to think is due to pursuit of some
fancied security, inspired by some irrational fear.2
He recognizes that rational fear must have a place in life,
but irrational fear is wholly bad, and the cause of muoh trouble.
He thinks that "one of the chief concerns of the scientific
moralist maast be to combat fear. This can be done in two ways:
by increasing security, and by cultivating courage. "^ He be-
lieves that increasing security will diminish cruelty and hatred.
Oppression has been one great cause of fear, and justice can do
away with this. Through education and science courage can be
increasedj indeed, he thinks it likely that "there is no limit
to what science could do in the way of increasing courage."4
"hrhat I Believe,, p. 59.
2"What I Believe", Sorum, 82 (1929), p. 134.
3what I BeUeve, p. 70
4Ibid.7 T>. 75.
m
-51-
c. Hi 8 Condemnation of Puritanism.
Puritanism is one of the types of conventional morality
which Russell regards as unqualifiedly bad. He thinks that the
^uritanioal contempt for pleasure has led us into contempt for
happiness. In condemning art, Puritanism has thwarted the crea-
tive impulses, producing an element of cruelty in conventional
morality*1 "We may define a Puritan," he says, "as a man who
holds that certain kinds of acts, even if they have no visible
bad effects upon others than the agent, are inherently sinful,
and ought to be prevented by whatever means is most effectual.*2
He admit 8 that Puritanism has championed democracy and freed the
•laves, but its moral fervor usually results in lack of sympathy
"The practical objection to Puritanism.as to every form of
fanaticism, is that it singles out certain evils as so much
worse than others that they must be suppressed at all costs.
The fanatic fails to recognize that the suppression of a real
evil, if carried out too drastically, produces other evils
which are even great3r."3
Puritanism has developed the love of power, which, though
it "camouf lages itself as love of doing good," produces tyranny,
hatred, and war. The Puritanic "sense of sin" makes men unhappy
and gives a feeling of inferiority. Further, "Our nominal moral
ity has been formulated by priests and mentally enslaved women.
It is time that men who have to take a normal part in the normal
life of the world learned to rebel against this sickly nonsense.
Its influence may be checked by "a broader education and a wider
knowledge of mankind."^
J-How To Be ?ree_ and Happy.
SaaaaLLfial £asS£a> pp« 124-125.
3Ibid.( p. 127,
4Tfta Conquest of Hap_pi_ness, p. 104.
5 Sceptical S3 says, p*. 131 •
c;
-52-
3. His Views on Sex and Sexual Morality,
Russell's attaok on traditional and conventional morality
regarding sex matters runs like a refrain through most of his
writing on ethical and social questions. He thinks that "es-
pecially in what concerns sex, our current morality contains
a very great deal of which the origin is purely superstitious."1-
He says that the present morals regarding sex and marriage have
developed from interest in maintaining the authority of the
father, combined with the ascetic attitude of Christianity,
which felt there was "something essentially impure in the sexual
act,"2 though this was entirely due to superstition.
Russell holds that two questions should be asked regarding
any system of marriage; First, how does it affect the development
and character of the men and women concerned? Second, what is
it 8 influence on the propagation and education of children?3
He thinks our present laws regarding marriage tend to depress
life rather than give it chance for expression. The law should
only be "concerned with marriage through the question of child-
ren, and should be indifferent to what is called morality, which
is based upon custom and texts of the Bible, not upon any real
consideration of the needs of the community."*
Again and again Russell reiterates the idea that society
should have no part what even? in the regulation of the private
sex relations of individuals, unless or until children come on
^TThat £ Be lis ye. a. p. 41.
2Marri age and Morals u p . 57 ,
3why Men Fight , p. 185.
4Ibid., p. 201.
-53-
the scene, in which case the state should step in with full
authority to llok after their welfare more than at present.1-
He says further, "I think that all sex relations which do not
involve children should be regarded as a purely private affair,
and that if a man and woman choose to live together without hav-
ing children, that should be no one*s business but their own.*2
He would not have us forget, however, that "children, rather
than sexual intercourse, are the true purpose of marriage.*3
Por love Russell has a very high regard. "Love is what
gives intrinsic value to marriage, and, like art and thought,
it is one of the supreme things which makes human life worth
preserving." Marriage cannot be good without love, but ulti-
mate satisfaction cannot be found in love alone, as it is "too
circumscribed*" Marriage at its best has a "purpose which goes
beyond love." It must "stretch out into the future," and "be
always growing, and infinite with the infinity of human endea-
vor." Most people find the needed purpose in children. When
this need remains unsatisfied it often causes much unhapoiness.4
There is sometimes antagonism between religion and natural
love because of the ascetic strain in Christianity. He finds
that economic success is the greatest enemy of love, however,
as it takes so much of a man's time and energy. Love and off-
spring are needed to make life good, for "Love, children, and
work are the great sources of fertilizing contact between the
iHow To Be Vreg. and Happy,, po. 34-35; What I Believe, p. 49.
^Marri age and Morals a. p. 16 5.
3Ibid«, p. 166.
TWhy Men Eight , PP« 208-210.
Carriage and Morals. P- 120.
-54-
individual and the rest of the world."1
Russell believes, however, that, though monogamous marriage
worked well among primitive people, as we become civilized we
develop more individuality, and there is less likelihood of life-
long happiness with a single partner. Divorce may be one solu-
tion, hut is undesirable where there are children. For their
sake, unfaithfulness in marriage must often be overlooked. For
happiness in marriage, there should be complete equality, mutual
freedom, the most complete physical and mental intimacy, and a
similarity in regard to standards of values. "Given these con-
ditions, I believe marriage to be the best and most important
relation that can exist between two human beings."2
Further, Russell holds that "in a rational ethic, marriage
would not count as such in the absence of children."*5 He thinks
that the "companionate marriage" proposed by Judge Ben B. Lind-
sey is "the proposal of a wise conservative," who is seeking
"to introduce some stability into the sexual relations of the
young, in place of the present promiscuity."4 He thinks this
much better than prostitution, which endangers the health of the
community, and degrades the persons practicing it. He says,
"^eople may come together for sex alone, as occurs in prostitu-
tion, or for companionship involving a sexual element, as in
Judge Lindsey's companionate marriage, or finally, for the pur-
pose of rearing a family. These are all different, and no
.foarri age and Morals, p« 125.
2Ibid. , p. 143.
"Ibid., p. 155.
4Ibid., p. 152.
morality oan be adequate to modern oircumst ancas which confounds
them in one indiscriminate total."1
Russell thinks we should be concerned about the family,
chiefly because of its effect upon the children. The
development of individualism and the movement for equality of
women with men have weakened the family very much, and may re-
sult in the elimination of fatherhood in care of the family*
The state would take over the functions of the father in the
2
care of children, resulting in a maternal society.* The result
would not likely be good, however, for children need the mascu-
line touch, especially boys,3 and the lack of companionship
would affect both men and women seriously. The emotional life
of men would tend to become trivial and thin, leading to bore-
dom and despair, and indifference to procaeation.^ Women might
no longer desire children, and professional motherhood would
become necessary, tending to make life mechanical.^ State train-
ing of children would result in dead uniformity , among .persons.
Sex is physical, while love is ideal, but the two should
blend and find fruition in the marriage union,6 The sex instinct
is not satisfied by the sex act alone \ it needs court ship > love,
and companionship to make it satisfactory.7 "The essence of a
good marriage is respect for each other's personality, combined
with a deep intimacy, physical, mental, and spiritual, which make
Carriage and Morals* P* 157.
2lbid, , px>. 91-92 and pp. 183-188.
3lbil., p. 195.
4lbid., pt>. 200-203.
&Ibid., p. 215.
°Ibid. , p. 285.
7Ibid., p. 297*
l. ,
a serious love between man and woman the most fructifying of
all human experiences."1 Russell thinks that failure to satisfy
the sex instinct is dangerous to life, for he says, "To be un-
able to inspire sex love is a grave misfortune to any man or
woman, since it deprives him or her of the greatest joys that
life has to offer. This deprivation is almost sure sooner or
later to destroy zest and produce introversion."2
The taboos of conventional morality militate against free-
dom in marriage relations which is essential for the satisfac-
tion of love and instinct, according to Russell. "The only sex
relations that have real value are those in which there is no
reticence and in which the whole persor lity of both becomes
merged in a new collective personality* Of all forms of caution,
caution in love is perhaps most fatal to true haopiness."
3. The "Place of Happiness in the Good Life.
Ruseell should doubtless be classified as a hedonist, though
he is far from regarding pleasure as the chief thing to be sought
after in life. He declares pleasure is not an end in itself,
although it may add greatly to the satisfaction of life. Neither
does happiness consist in a good income, as only a certain mini-
mum of material things - is essential for nappy living. He thinks
Jesus teaches a good formula for happy living: "Take no thought
what ye shall eat , or what ye shall drink, or wherewithal ye
^Marriage and Morals,, p. 320.
-The Conquest of Happiness, pp. 181-132.
3Ibid., p. 186.
r
t
<
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t
-57-
shall be clothed." We let minor things annoy us too much. If
we get rid of fear and worry we may enjoy "the freedom of the
universe . "*
Russell believes that life should be expansive and creative,
giving the great impulses opportunity for expression. Discipline
is necessary, "but the discipline you have in your life should
be one determined by your own desires and your own needs> not
put upon you by society or authority."* One immediately wonders
just how much disciplining power there is in desire, except for
selfish impulses. Desire is a personal affair, and can hardly
be depended upon to discipline us in^social way, except in so
far as it leads us to conform to society's demands in order to
enjoy its approval or avoid its disapproval* but this is just
what Russell calls conformity to conventional standards. Ke
recognizes social obligation, but one wonders how much desire
may be depended upon to enforce it, since it is unstable and
impulsive.
Russell considers individual freedom one of the essential
elements of happinees. Ke finds this is interfered with by the
great amount of "active malevolence" in the world, which is
"The worst feature of human nature, and the one which it is
most necessary to change if the world is tD grow happier*"*'
This malevolence is due to various causes, but one of the prin-
ciple ones is fear. Fear, as we have seen, is best overcome
^How To Be ffree and Happy* p. 28,
2Ibid., p. 33.
3 What I Believe, p. 68.
<
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-58-
by increasing gensrai security and developing courage in people.
Other causes of malevolence are envy and disappointment . These
could "be largely overcome by making life "happier and fuller,"
which science could do much to accomplish if properly used.1
To attain hapniness Russell would have life less regulated
and methodical» giving "nature" more opportunity for free play
and development. Artificial conditions thwart the natural im-
pulses too often, and cause urhappine 38»^ We should make phy-
sical nature serve human nature. So far, we have used science
toomuch for destructive ends, "but this phase will pass when
men have acquired the same domination over their own passions
that they already have over the physical forcee of the external
world. Then at last we shall have won our freedom*"3 And with
this freedom, Russell believes, will cone happiness.
In his book, The Conquest of Happiness, Russell enters
into a discussion of the causes of unhappiness. He says, "I
believe this unhappiness to be very largely due to mistaken
views of the world, mistaken ethics, mistaken habits of life,
leading to ie at ruction of that natural zest and appetite for
possible things upon which all happiness, whether of men or
animals, ultimately depends."4 Chance may play some part, but
"given average good fortune," he believes it lies "within the
power of the individual" to achieve happiness in this life.
Here he gives some interesting siae-lights upon his own
^•Ibid., pp. 78-79.
2Ibid., p. 84.
3Ibid., p. 87.
4? he Conquest of Happiness, p. 16.
-59-
life, concerning which he s&ye:
"I was not born happy. As a chili my favorite hymn was:
^eary of earth and laden with my sin.' At the age of five,
I reflected that, if I should live to be seventy, I had only
endured, sc far, a fourteenth part of my life, and I felt the
long- spread- out boredom ahead of me to be almost unsnduratle.
In adolescence, I hated life and was continually on the verge
of suicide, from which, however, I was restrained by the de-
sire to know more mathematics. Now, on the contrary, I enjoy
life; I might almost say that with every year that passes I
enjoy it more. This is due partly to having discovered what
were the things that I most desired, and having gradually
acquired many of these things. "Partly it is due to having
successfully dismissed certain objects of desire.... as essen-
tially unattainable* ,But very largely it is due to a dimin-
ishing preoccupation with myself •
Russell says that his early training was "Puritanical, which
led him to morbid introspection, but that as external interests
developed and interest in his own deficiencies grew less, his
happiness increased. Therefore he advocates wide interests
outside oneself. "Every external interest inspires some acti-
vity which, so long as the interest remains alive, is a com-
plete preventive of ennui . Interest in oneself, on the con-
trary, leads to no activity of a progressive kind."*
He thinks vanity and love of power are normal elements of
human nature, but should not be excessively developed. In fact,
ovejr- development of any one element of human nature at the ex-
pense of the others is likely to cause ubhappiness. The person
who feels completely thwarted may seek "distraction and oblivion"
in pleasure. Pleasure becomes "temporary suicide" bringing a
"momentary cessation of unhaprciness."^
Cynicism may be produced by achieving one's desires too
AIbid,, pp. 16-17.
2Ibid., p, 18.
3lbii. , pp. 23-24 .
-60-
easily, for "to "be without some of the things you want is an
indispensable part of happiness."1 Some despair because every-
thing changes and passes, but Russell thinks this should he
ground for optimism rather than pessimisto, since it makes for
progress*
He thinks that love is "bringing more joy to life than for-
merly. "There is now a great deal more happiness in connection
with love and a great deal more genuine "belief in the value of
love than there was sixty years ago." Love is to "be valued,
first, "as in itself a source of delight, " and second, ""because
it enhances all the "best pleasures, such as music, and sunrise
in the mountains, and the sea under the full moon."*1 Could
anything "be more idealistic? Yet Russell has no place for
values in his scheme of reality 2
Competition, which is so prevalent in all phases of our
modern life, he finds to he a great source of unhappiness.
Boredom and excitement he regards as extremes to be
avoided, since an overdose of either will bring unhappiness.
"Boredom!,, however, is not to be regarded as wholly evil*... A
life too full of excitement is an exhausting life, in which
continually stronger stimuli are needed to give the thrill that
has come to be thought an essential pert of pleasure."3 Train-
ing oneself to endure a certain amoiart of boredom will be bene-
ficial, and contribute to contentment in living.
XIbid., p* 29.
Ibid., pp. 37-39.
Ibid., p. 51.
-61-
Undue fatigue, due to overwork or worry, may cause unhap-
piness. In regard to worry, Russell thinks that if misfortune
threatens* it is best to consider "deliberately what is the
worst that could possibly happen," and then realize the reasons
why this would not really be so seriousi since * nothing that
hardens to oneself has any cosmic importance." "Worry is a form
of fear," and fear is generally due to "some danger which we are
unwilling to face." We snoula face fear "rationally and calmly"
until it becomes familiar and "familiarity will blunt its ter*
rors." He advises, "When you find yourself inclined to brood
on anything, no matter what, the best plan always is to think
about it even more than ycu naturally would until at last its
morbid fascination has worn off."1 Russell is apparently fol-
lowing the advice of the old adage: "Familiarity breeds con-
tempt." There is no doubt truth in it in regard to some things.
One wonders about it though in the light of what psychology
tells us concerning the laws of habit formation, and what the
psycho-analyst telle us about obsessions. Brooding along some
lines is dangerous, and produces very bad results. It has led
some to suicide and murder. Hasn't Russell considered this?
Also it does net fit in well with his condemnation of intro-
spection because it leads to morbidity * noted above.
Envy and jealousy Russell finis are two of the greatest
enemies of hapniness. Civilization seems to have increased
envy rather than to have remedi-ed the evil. Unless a remedy
XIbid., pp. 77-78.
-62-
ia found, however, he thinks "our civilization ia in danger of
going down to de at ruction in an orgy of hatred. "^
Hatred aeema more prevalent than friendly feeling among
people to-day because civilisation makes ua dissatisfied. We
feel we have "missed the meaning of life." We see batter pos-
sibilities than we have achieved* Russell thinks we have not
reached the final stage in evolution, cut to find the way to
something "better "civilized man must enlarge his heart as he
has enlarged his mind. He must learn to transcend self, and
in so doing to acquire the freedom of the Universe."
Prom the Puritanical outlook on life we have inherited
a "sense of sin," which gives a feeling of inferiority, divides
personality, and makes us self -centered.**
The persecution mania, which causes unhappiness to many,
is generally due to an over-inflated sense of one's own impor-
tance. Fear of public opinion is a cause of much inhibiting
of thought and action, especially among young people. On this
point Ruaaell aay8: "While it ia desirable that the old ahould
treat with respect the wishes of the young, it is not desirable
that the young should treat with respect the wishes of the old."
In general, "there is too much respect paid to the opinions of
others."4 Russell is thinking here of progress and the possi-
bility of individual development of initiative and originality,
no doubt, but how can revenence for the past be developed if
Jlbid., p. 92,
~Ibid.» pp. 93-94.
Jlbid.» pp. 106-108.
4Ibid., pp. 13 5--136.
ft .
-63-
the young are not to respect the wishes of the old? Or how
can antisocial tendencies be checked without resort to harsh
measures? Apparently Russell has a constant battle on between
his individualistic desires and his realization of the impor-
tance of social values, with one sometimes ermergin^as victor,
and sometimes the other* Of course, there is much truth on
both sides, and it is difficult to strike a balance. Perhaps
Russell does as well as most of us could.
After this minute analysis of the causes of unhappiness,
Russell sets forth the things making for happiness as he sees
them. He decides that happiness is possible in this world* He
thinks men of science find it easier to be haopy than most of
the educated classes.1 He regards companionship and co-opera-
tion as essential elements for happiness. A hobby is likely
to contribute greatly to happiness, since it furnishes "a means
of escape from reality." "A friendly interest in persons and
things," he thinks the greatest source of happiness, but "an
interest in impersonal things" is also a help.2
There should be "zest" in living if one would be happy*
Affection contributes to it and "gives general self-confidence
towards life. "3 children need it especially* In sex- love it
contributes greatly to "reciprocal happiness." Russell finds
that "of all the institutions that have come down to tas from
the past none is in the present day so disorganized and derailed
^bid., p. 145.
2Ibid.» ff. 155-157.
3IJaid±J pp. 160-178.
-64-
as the family," and believes that "thia failure of the family
to proviae the fundamental satisfactions which in prinoiple it
is capable of yielding is one of the deep-seated causes of the
discontent which is prevalent in our age.*1 There has been a
great change in the relationships of parents and children,
"Parents are no longer sure of their rights as against their
children; children no longer feel that they owe respect to their
parents."* (It seems that one might expect this to follow if the
principle that Russell laid down that "the young should not re-
spect the wishes of the old" is to be taken seriously, but per-
haps the consequences of that principle may be undesirable in
some respects.)
One of life's deep satisfactions is found in parenthood,
Russell believes. "To be happy in this world, especially when
youth is past, it is necessary to feel oneself not merely an
isolated individual whose day will soon be over, but part of
the stream of life flowing on from the first germ to the remote
and unknown future."3
"Work" he finds desirable "as a preventive of boredom."4
But there should be in it "continuity of purpose, " along with
the opportunity for the "exercise of skill", and the doing of a
constructive task. "The satisfaction to be derived from success
in a great constructive enterprise is one of the nost massive
that life has to offer."5
Jlbid., p. 167.
~Ibid, , p. 193.
Jlbid., t>. 198.
*Ibid., p. 210.
5Ibid., p. 216.
* -
"Impersonal interests* contribute to happiness by drawing
one*s attention away from oneself, ani helping to "a sense of
proportion," Russell thinks. "A large conception of man and
his place in the universe" will keep us from becoming unduly
impressed with the importance of our own time and place in the
world. When tempted to adopt dubious methods to gain immediate
ends, if the long road man has come from barbarism is kept in
mind, "you will realize that the momentary battle upon which
you are engaged cannot be of such importance as to risk a back-
ward step towards the darkness out of which we have been slowly
emerging." Even though defeated temporarily, having in mind
"purposes that are distant and slowly unfolding," the conscious-
ness of being linked with "a great army of those who have led
mankind towards a civilized outlook," will result in "a certain
deep happiness." Tfctua "life will become a communion with the
great of all ages, and personal death no more than a negligible
incident
Once a person has realized what makes "greatness of soul"
he cannot be content to be petty, self-seeking, and fearful of
fate, declares Russell. He "will open wide the windows of his
mind, letting the winds blow freely upon it from every portion
of the universe." He will realize the limitations and brevity
of human life, and that "in individual minds is concentrated
whatever of value the known universe contains."2 Breadth of
interests enables one to "bear misfortune well," not leaving
"the whole meaning and purpose of life at the mercy of accident."
Jlbid., p. 226.
2Ibid., pp. 227-228.
•66-
To sum up, Russell holds that for happiness a few simple
"but indispensable things are needed: food and shelter, health,
love, successful work, the respect of one *s fellows, and, for
some, oarenthood. The rest is in one fs attitude of mind toward
the universe and his fellowmen.
F. Education in Relation to the Good Life.
1. Reason As A Factor in Life.
Russell thinks that reason has "been the most powerful factor
in the shaping of the history of the world, and that it is domi-
nating life more and more, "To save the world requires faith
and courage: faith in reason, and courage to proclaim what rea-
son show 8 to be true* It is not a hopeless task to save the
world, but it will never be achieved by those who allow them-
selves to think it hopeless*"1
He thinks that "rationality in opinion is merely. ... the
habit of taking account of all relevant evidence in arriving
at a belief ."^ Science seeks objective truth, or factf theo-
retical rationality consists in basing beliefs on facts, or
evidence, rather than upon "wishes, prejudices, or traditions."
Practical rationality is difficult to obtain because of con-
flicting desires and passions. "Rationality in practice may
be defined as the habit of remembering all our relevant desires,
and not only the one which happens at the moment to be strongest
^"Sources of "°ower Over Opinion," Freeman* 7(1923), p. 226.
Sceptical Essays, pp. 46-47.
-67-
Ultimately, "the control of our acts by our own intelligence"
is of most importance, "It is to intelligence, increasingly
widespread, that we must look for the solution of the ills from
which our world is suffering."1
Russell believes that the reason modern youth tends to be
largely
cynical is that the intellectual person has no place of re-
cognition in the modern world unless "he is willing to sell his
services to the stupid rich, either as propagandist or as court
jester." This results in the sacrificing of his ideals, and he
covers the loss by "a dash of cynicism." Men of scienoe have
an opportunity to use their brains in worth-while ways, but a
person with literary training cannot exercise it "in any manner
that appears important to himself." The only way out is to
educate those who hold power and run the world of affairs.
This is no doubt very difficult, but Russell believes it is
2
not impossible.
2. Scientific Method As A Means of Finding the Truth.
Russell holds scientific method in very high regard, and
believes that the attitude of mind employed in scientific re-
search should be applied as fir as possible in all the activi-
ties of life. One reason for its desirability is that
"scientific method sweeps aside our wishes and endeavors to
arrive at opinions in which wishes play no part."^ Further,
^Sce^tioal Essays, p • 54 .
2"Why Is Modern Youth Cynical?" Harjoerjs, ISO (May, 1930
pp • 720-724.
S^he Scientific Outlook, p. 44.
- +
t
-68-
the scientific tender never asserts that what we now believe
is "exact ly right;,... It is a stage on the road towards exact
truth."1
He thinks it possible that "scientific scepticism. . • .may
lead in the end to the collapse of the scientific eaa."2 Science
is becoming chiefly the "pursuit of power," while the "pursuit
of truth" is being destroyed by scepticism as to the possibility
of finding truth.3
3. "Purpose and Method in JSduoation.
Russell says that education seeks "the formation, through
instruction, or certain mental habits and a certain outlook on
life." The whole life is built around the instincts and impul-
ses, and the purpose of education is to enlarge the scope of
these impulses that nature has provided* It should not try
to implant a set of virtues, or to overcome or oppose these
impulses, and so thwirt or eradicate nature, as some tradi-
tional theories have t aught
"Education destroys the crudity of instinct, and increases
through knowledge the wealth and variety of the individual^
contacts with the outside world, making him no longer an
isolated fighting unit, but a citizen of the universe, em-
bracing distant countries, remote regions of space, and vast
stretches of past and future within the circle of his in-
terests. It is this simultaneous softening in the insis-
tence of desire and enlargement of its scope that is the
chief moral aim or education." w
^Ibid., p. 6 5.
2Ibid. , t>. 94.
3Ibid., p. 100.
4Mvstici sm and Logic, p. 37.
5Ibid., p. 39.
-69-
The intellectual aim of education, he thinks, is "to make
us see and imagine the world in an objective manner. ... and not
merely through the distorting medium of personal desire." Edu-
cation is to be judged successful "in proportion as it gives us
a true view of our place in society," in the world and the uni-
verse
He thinks education should train us in the application of
scientific attitudes toward the problems of living. "The scien-
tific attitude of mind involves a sweeping away of all other
desires in the interests of the desire to know." The scientific
attitude is ethically neutral; it is an attitude of disinterested
curiosity which gives escape into a larger life. It is this
method which education should always use.
Again, Russell declares that education should train pupils
to think, to adventure mentally , to "find in creative thought
an outlet which is neither wasteful nor cruel, but increases
the dignity of man by incarnating in life some of that shining
splendor which the human spirit is bringing down out of the un-
known." In general, people fear thought more than death, he
says* because it is revolutionary, indifferent to authority and
established institutions, with an anarchic element about it.
"Thought is great and swift and free, the light of the world,
and the chief glory of man." Education should be inspired by
"a shining vision of the society that is to be," rather than
interested simply in maintaining existing institutions.^
^blsU, p. 42.
2Ibid., p. 44.
5 Why Men Fight, ff . 178-180.
-70-
4. Criticism of Traditional Methods in Education,
Russell condemns traditional education because it has
become a political institution, seeking to induce "beliefs
rather than thought. The worship of success leads to ruthless-
nes8, and education "is infected through and through with ruth-
lessness and glorification of social inequality."-*- Universal
compulsory education has been adopted in democratic countries
in order to make democracy possible, or for commercial advan-
tage, so that state education has a bias. "Parents frequently
manipulate the education of their children so as to further
their own interests. Thus all powers with authority tend to
disregard the child as an end in itself • We have already noted
that Russell believes that superstition pervades much of our
traditional education.3 Reform is needed, he maintains, for
at present "everything concerned with the creation of life is
thought abominable, while everything concerned wiith taking life
is exalted as noble." This he calls "the morality of suicide,"
due to "the fact that we attach value to power, rather than to
fulness of life."4
Even under socialism Russell thinks there would be danger
of the state using education to further its own creed, with-
holding what knowledge it chose and so making progress impos-
sible. It might even be less progressive than at present. *
1Why Men F iff fat , p. 175.
2SceT>t ioal Essays, pp. 191-19 5.
?What I Believe, p. 45.
:"Things That Have Moulded Me," Dial, 83 (Sept., 1927) pp. 185-6.
5"Socialism and Education," Harper's, 151 (1925) pp. 413-417.
5. Ideals for Education in Achieving the Good Life,
Russell says, "The ideal system of education must be demo-
cratic, although that ideal is not immeiiately attainable."1
We must always beware of "a dead level of uniformity," In the
debate as to whether education should be "useful" or "cultural",
we must be careful lest we come to attach "intrinsic value only
to physical ssfcisf actions." "The real issue is: should we, in
education, aim at filling the mind with knowledge which has
direct practical utility, or should we try to give our oupils
mental -noc sessions which are good on their own account?"2
It is important that education should aim to diminish
physical evils, but we cannot afford to ignore the "humanistic
elements" of education. For,
"To know something of great literature, something of world
history, something of music and painting and architecture,
is essential if the life of imagination is to be fully de-
veloped. And it is only through the imagination that men
become aware of what the world might be; without it, 'pro-
gress* would become mechanical and trivial. But science,
also, can stimulate the imagination."3
Russell points out that "in a mechanistic civilization,
there is grave danger of a crude utilitarianism, which sacri-
fices the whole , as st net ic side of life to what is called Effi-
ciency1." He holds that language is not "merely a means of
communication," but should also be "a vehicle of beauty."4
Instead of discipline through force, self -discipline is
now taught children through games. Thus habits are formed.
^Education and the Good Life , p. 16.
2Ibid. , p. 23.
3I bid. , pp. 29-30.
4Ibid., p. 31.
-72-
Before undertaking to educate a -©arson, we need "some con-
ception of the kind of person we wish to oroduce," and what sort
of education will achieve thfes fcesult. The educator should love
the children for themselves, but this is not enough; "it is ne-
cessary also that he should have a right conception of Human ex-
cellence ... .Even those who love all mankind may err through a
wrong conception of the good life."1
Russell gives four characteristics which he believes "form
the basis of an ideal character: vitality, courage, sensitive-
ness, and intelligence ."* He believes that a single generation
of intelligant, fearless men could "sweep away the cruelty and
pain which we endure because we ar 2 lazy, cowardly, hard-hearted,
and stupid." Education can make us good or bad. "Education is
the key to the new world."
If he were given power to reorganize higher education, Rus-
sell would attempt to give young people a vivid realization of
the past, and of the possibilities of the future, emphasizing
the transit orine 88 of physical life. At the same time, he would
impress th3m with "the greatness of which the individual is cap-
able, and the knowledge that throughout all the depths of stellar
3T>ace nothing of equal value is known to us."4
Once again let us remind ourselves that Russell is a mate**-
rialist with no ulace foe valu3s in ultimate reality I
Jlbid., po. 58-59.
iribid., o. 50.
~Ibid., p. 83.
Conquest of Happi qe.ss, po. 325-227.
-73
III. Russell^ Social Views.
A. In General.
Russell's interest in social theories began years ago. He
published! a study of German Socialism in 1895. It was both his-
torical and critical. He sympathized witn the aims of the move-
ment so far as it promoted humanitarian interests, out he "be-
lieved some changes would be necessary in the doctrines and pro-
gram of Marxian Socialism.!
Since the War, Russsll's interest in society and social
reforms has grown tremendously, and almost every book or maga-
now
zins article he ^writes has some discussion of social subjects.
About 1921-1922 Hussell spent five weeks in Russia and a
year in China, during which time he developed a new appreciation
of eastern culture and ideals of happiness. He finds among them
the same fundamental requirements for a happy life as among the
western peoples, but he thinks that they are mo re interested in
pursuing them than we are. Sor the most part they are not in-
terested in seeking power and dominion. They have more tolerance
and patience than have we* On the whole, he thinks the Wast
may learn as much from the East as the Sast from the Vast. The
only place we can claim superiority to the east is in scientific
method and scientific discovery, but. this may not turn out to be
to our advantage unless we can get a better conception of the
ends of life*2
^German Social I)e_mo oaaoy..
3 The 2r_3ble_m of China]] also Sceptical E33ay_3» PP« 101-110.
-74-
In collaboration with his wife, Mrs. Dora Russell, he has
written an article on "What Makes A Social System Good! or Bad?"1
They maintain that there are "two elements in a good society:
(1) the present well-being of those who compose it, and (2) itB
capacity for developing into something better." They think peo-
ple are losing faith in our present system, and a new faith is
needed, or a new system that people can believe in. "2Jo man
can be happy unless he feels his life is in some way important;
so long as his life remains a futile round of pleasures or pains
leading to no end, realizing no purpose that he can believe to be
of value, so long it is impossible to escane despair.""' Then
appear word* with a Kantian ring. "Although it may sound old-
fashioned to say so, I do not believe that a tolerable existence
is possible for an individual man or a society without some sense
of" duty. . . , There is only one kind of duty that the modern man
can acknowledge without superstition, and that is duty to the com-
munity."2
Although he is a socialist himself, Russell has come to the
oonclusion that State Socialism and Communism are both unsatis-
factory, because of the dangers of bureaucracy and dead unifor-
mity, which could easily stifle individuality. He thinks now
that Guild Socialism combined with Syndicalism and some elements
of Anarchism would^likely to be the most satisfactory system.0
In analyzing the great movements of history from the He-
gelian point of view, showing the oscillations from synthesis and
1Century. , 104 (1922), pp. 14-21.
2 Ibid. , p. 20.
Proposed Road* to Freedom.
-75-
intolerance to analysis and tolerance, and "back again, he con-
cludes that we are now in a synthetic ani intolerant age, wnich
brings us Bolshevism and Fascism. i There are only two great
oowers in the world: America representing Capitalism in the "West,
and Russia representing Bolshevism in the East, Ke criticizes
the philosophy of each and concludas that both are founded on
economic principles of organization, so that neither take into
account the biological side of man's life. He thinks that nei-
ther capitalism nor communism is adequate to meet the needs of
human life, for "The fundamental delusion of our time, in my
opinion," he says, "is the excessive emphasis upon the economic
aspects of life."^
Russell believes that America is developing a new philosophy.
It is an industrial and machine philosophy, dominated by the be-
lief that man is master of his fate and need not submit to many
physical evils that were formerly feared. European philosophy
has been dominated by "contemplation," wnich gives an attitude
of reverence toward the universe, "hardly compatible with the be-
lief in man1s omnipotence through the machins." American philo-
sophy has an Instrumental Theory, he thinks, which might be de-
fined thus: "To know something is to be able to change it as we
wish." It believes that even human nature can be changed, and
education can produce better people. He believes that America
is leading the way in a great transition of thought. It is a
period barren of art, but perhaps new art forms will emerge
^Effective Intolerance," Qe nt ury , 115 (Jan., 1938), pp. 316-325.
2Ibid., p. 324.
3"New *°hil080T5hy of America," Fortnightly Review, 129 (May, 1928),
pp. 518-523.
-76-
"appropriate to modern life," He finds a painf ul part of this
changing outlook is "the diminution in the value and indepen-
dence of the individual, " hut in a machine civilization the group
becomes the most important item* But the mastery over nature
which the machine gives, he thinks worth a high price.
In recent travels in America Russell has found there is
great similarity in the type and viewpoint of the people in all
parts of the country,1 Uniformity appears not only in matsrial
matters, "but also in thought and opinion. This uniformity has
advantages and disadvantages. The chief advantage is that "it
produces a population capable of peaceable co-operation;" while
the chief disadvantage is that "it produces a population prone
to persecution of minorities." Russell thinks it is "a mistaken
conception of democracy" to "believe that "all men should "be
alike." They should really be like the different parts of an
organism, not all like one part. Tne "business man is coming to
be the standard type in America* He admits that standardization
is likely to increase the happiness of the average man, since it
makes it easier for him to fit into society, but it has great dis-
advantages for the exceptional individual. Russell thinks Europe
will ultimately follow America in standardization of life, which
will probably make internationalism easier of accomplishment.
He Relieves now that "the road to Utopia is clear; it lies
partly through politics and partly through changes in the indi~
vidual."2 In politics, we must establish an international
■'■•Homogeneous America," Out look , 154 (Feb. 19, 1930), pp. 285-7.
2"What I Believe," Fornm, 82 (Sept. 1929), pp. 129-134.
< I
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government. Ha thinks this will be achieved through "the world
government of the United States." The individual must be made
"less prone to hatred and fear," which is a matter "partly phy-
siological and partly psychological." If the health of the young
is adequately cared for and their "vital impulses" are given
proper scope for development, "men and women will grow up more
courageous and less malevolent than they are at present*" With
this kind of people and an international government "the world
might become more stable and civilized," but at present "every
increase in scientific knowledge brings the destruction of
civilization nearer."^
B. The Place of the Individual in Society,
It sometimes seems that Russell is fighting for the rights
of the individual most of the time, yet he declares, "The in-
dividual is not the end and aim of his own being; outside the
individual, there is the community, the future of mankind, and
the immensity of the universe in which all our hopes and fears
are a mere pin-point."* On the other hand, "political ideals
should be based upon ideals for the individual life,"3 and
"political and social institutions are to be judged by the good
or harm that they do to individuals." Most of our institutions
at present "rest upon two things: property and power,"5 which
tend to repress the creative impulses. We should seek to develop
ilbid., p. 134.
2why Men Fifehfc , p. 207.
Political Ideals,. P»
"tlbid., p. 14.
5Ibid., p* 16.
If • ■ * t
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the distinct individuality of each parson, giving all the free-
dom possible to the creative impulses, thus increasing self -re-
spect and reverence for others.
The individual is helpless before the vast modern state,1
Russell thinks, yet our civilization cannot eliminate vast or-
ganization, but it can make their management democratic.*^ He
believes that "Democracy is a device--the best so far invented--
for diminishing as much as possible the interference of govern-
ments wit h liberty,"3 There should be the utmost freedom for
individuals and societies in conducting their own affairs, but
not in their dealings with others. Governments must use force
sometimes, no doubt, but "the coercion of an individual or a
group is always in itself more or Is 33 harmful, " and "Forces
should only be used against those who attempt to use force
against others, or against those who will not respect the law
in cases where a common decision is necessary-114
In the economic ltf« of the community and in international
relations, mow regulation, and maintainance of law and order is
needed. In matters regarding other than material possessions,
however, public control should be almost aone away.5 The ten-
dency of public opinion to press the individual into a conven-
tional mold should be stoutly resisted. The creative impulse
of the artist should be given free play, "To respect it in
oneself and in others makes up nine-tenths of the good life,"^
^Vhy Men Fight , pp. 61-54.
political Ideals,, p, 25.
flbid., p, 337
TIbid., pp. 28-30.
?Ibid., p^D. 10 5-110.
°Ibid., p. 128.
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Russell believes tha community should not interfere in
"matters where what one man posseaees is not obtained at the
expense of another," that is, in matters of opinion, knowledge,
and art.1 The "maximum of freedom" will be secured when char-
acter is formed lay education "so that men may find their happi-
ness in activities which are not oppressive." This should be
done lay teaching children "to live and let live,"
Thus we see that Russell's aim is the fullest, freest,
happiest life possible for the individual, but he realizes that
this cannot be obtained except in co-operation with his fellow-
men. Russell's optimism as to the possibilities is shown in the
declaration he makes that in twnety years, lay united effort, the
civilized countries of the world could "abolish all abject pov-
erty, quite half the illness in the world, and the whole econo-
mic slavery which binds down nine-tenths of our population; we
could fill the world with joy and beauty, and secure the reign
of universal peace. "2
1. Social Aspects of the Good Life.
So we see that Russell welieves that the achievement of
•the Good Life* for the individual is a social affair. Tra-
ditional ideas of "salvation" have been individualistic, but
in the modern world we need "rather a social than an individual
conception of salvation."3 The good life demands for its
iSceptical Sssaya,. p. 130.
Political Ideals.,. p« 35.
"^What I Believe, pp. 56-57.
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realization "a multitude of social conditions," such as know-
ledge that requires extensive research, and education, which
can only be carried on by governments. Thus, "in all that dif-
ferentiates between a good life and a bad one, the world is a
unity, and the man who pretends to live independently is a con-
scious or unconscious parasite,"-1- Living the good life involves
majiy elements, education, friends, love, children, if desired,
good health, interesting work, and sufficient income to prevent
want and anxiety* Consequently, "the good life must be lived in
a good society, and is not fully possible otherwise."2
Another unfortunate feature of our individualistic idea of
salvation is the belief that it comes in a catastrophic form«
Consequently, we attempt to overthrow tyranny and war by use of
war* Russell thinks that revolutions may sometimes be necessary,
but "they are not shoirt cuts to the millenium. There is no,
short cut to the good life, whether individual or social," The
good life must be built up by developing»intelligence, self-
control, and sympathy."3 It is a process of gradual improvement.
C. Hi 8 Views on the State.
Russell recognizes the need for the State in regulating
the relations of people in society, but as usually managed it
tends to become oppressive and make 3 for anarchy among nations
in the world as a whole.4 Only a world state could really
kbid., o. 59.
2Ibid., T>p. 50-51,
Jlbid,, p, 54.
^Tny Men Fight., pp, 59L-60.
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accomplish the purpose which a at ate should accomplish, by sub-
stituting law for force in the relations between all groups,
JSven law is not wholly satisfactory in settling disputes, as it
is "too static, too much on the side of what is decaying, too
little on the side of what is growing," but it is better than
force, 1
States have supreme power over their subjects, and they
punish "with impartial rigor, both those who kill their compa-
triots and those who refuse to kill foreigners." This, Russell
thinks, "is the politics of Bedlam*"2 Ultimately, the chief
part of the power of the State rests upon public opinion,3
which is maintained in favor of the State by tradition and by
patriotism. "Patriotism is a combination of love and pride,
which amounts almost to a religion, but falls short of becoming
a real religion because it lacks universality. But it teaches
men to subordinate themselves to the State, and "when once men
have learned to subordinate their own good to the good of a
larger whole, there can be no valid reason for stopping short
of the human race."4 Hence the world-state*
Russell thinks the State aliould: (l) Maintain and promote
the general welfare, in regard to health, education, care of
ehildren, and encouragement of scientific research. (2) Pro-
mote law and order, avoiding injustice in administering the law
as far as possible. Voluntary organizations should be encouraged
ilbid., p. 56,
2Ibid., pp. 46-53,
3Ibid. , p. 50.
4Ibid., p. 57.
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to carry out any of these functions that they can. Individual
initiative should be encouraged, with little insistence on uni-
form system.l
He thinks it is an error to suppose that there is a good
of the 8tate apart from and higher than the good of the individ-
uals composing the State* The State is an "organism", in that
the parts are interdependent, but the idea that there is a "good
of the State" that is something peculiar to it, is an adminis-
trator's fallacy, meaning the "good of the statesmen," Accord-
ing to that point of view, each person is simply a part of the
machine * and individual happiness does not count.*
The chief source of evil in the State lies in the supposed
right of the State to use military force to enforce its will on
other St at 3 s^ and " so long as war remains a daily imminent
danger the State will remain a Moloch, 3acrif icing sometimes
the life of the individual and always his unfettered development,
to the barren struggle for mastry in competition with other
States."3
1, The Evil of War,
When the World War came on, Russell was amaz*d at the en-
thusiasm with which people took up the business of killing and
destruction. He felt that "Tne degradation of science from its
high function in ameliorating the lot of man is one of the most
painful aspects of this war."4 He appealed to the intellectuals
ilbid., pp. 70-78."
2Freedom in Education," flial, 74 (1923&, po. 153-lo4.
^Why Men Fight t pp. 77-78.
47ustice in War -Time, p* 17.
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to stop the war, but to no avail, for events were in the grip of
passions too elemental to heed this appeal* As a result, Russell
became an avowed opponent of the war-system as it operates among
states in the modern world. He concluded that, though some wars
seem justified because they appear to have brought some good to
mankind, in the long run the balance of evil is much against them,
and warfare has now become so destructive that nothing can be
said for it.1
After some study of the matter fiussell decided that passive
resistance could accomplish far more than armies and navies, but
as there is small chance that nations can be made to adopt this
method, he comes to the conclusion that the creation of a strong
central authority is about the only way to end war soon.**
Russell foresaw grave danger for civilization in the war,
and realized that the war would destroy many of the finer quali-
ties in the souls of the men who were fighting, and that bru-
tality and cruelty would be inculcated by the act of war. Many
of them would lose their ability to be useful citizens, he felt.
"The habit of violence, once acquired, however legitimately, is
not easily set aside, and the respect for law and order is likely
to be much less after the war than it was before," he declared. 3
If we remember that he wrot3 this in 1915, and then note the
great wave of crime following the war, and in which we are still
engulfed, we may be able to realize his prophetic ability. He
thought, too, that governments would be more autocratic after
hbid., p, 38,
irlbid. , pp. 40-59.
3Ibid,, p, 113.
(
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C
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the war, and the great development of. dictatorships justifies
him. In gegard to ending war "by means of war, he says, "It is
peace, not war, that in the long run turns men's thoughts away
from fighting."-^
"Blind impulse is the source of war," Russell holds, and
that impulse is purposeless in itself.2 "Impulse is the ex*
pression of life," but should "be turned to creative purposes.
He can find no support for war on rational grounds. War is only
large-scale duelling. "A nation wnich believes that its welfare
can only be secured by suffering and inflicting hundreds of
thousands of equally horrible sacrifices, is a nation which has
no very spiritual conception of what constitutes national wel-
fare." He believes further, that "it would be better to forego
material comfort, power, pomp, and otatward glory than to kill
and be killed, to hate and be hated, to throw away in a mad
moment of fury the bright heritage of the ages."**
As we have learned gradually to free our conception of God
from savagery, so, he believes, we must free our national idesuls*
"The world is ruled by a wrong spirit," which cannot be changed
overnight, but, in the long run, it will respond to vital think-
ing, for, he believes, "The power of thought ... .is greater than
any other human power."4 Community life demands integration,
but it must be on an international scale if we are to avoid war*
Our present system of organization fosters the possessive
ilbid., p. 115.
2 Why Men Fight , po* 12-13.
3Ibid.» pp. 114-116.
*Ibii., p. 247.
^bid. , pp. 255-256.
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-86-
iiqpulssa, which are hostile to the creative impulses. Kow,
"possession means taking and keeping some good thing which an-
other is prevented from enjoying; creation means putting into
the world a good thing which otherwise no one would be able to
enjoy." This leads Russell to declare that "the supreme prin-
ciple, both in politics and in private life, should be to pro-
mote all that ia creative, and so to_ diminish the impulses and
desires that center around possession."-*'
The real need of the world is for a new philosophy or re-
ligion to replace the view th?,t income is the principle thing.
In the meantime, some international organization is necessary,
for "the civilized races of the world are face4with the alterna-
tive of co-operation or mutual destruction."
2. Internationalism As A Way Out.
In other things than trade, Russell finds that "the in-
terests of nations coincide in all that makes what we call civi-
lization." Science, art, and literature are tne property of all.
If we consider what things make us civilized beings, "we shall
find that none, of them are things in which any one nation can
havs exclusive property, but all are things in which the whole
world oan share." Scholars, and scientists of many nations can
work together, and feel themselves "an outpost of civilization,
building a new, road into the virgin forest of the unknown*"'3
^bid., pp. 257 -2 58.
2"National Independence and Internationalism," Atlantic^ 119
(1917), p." 625.
3Ibid., p. 627.
r
-85-
Ruesell has contended for the establishment of an inter-
national authority in "mauy articles and books written since the
war. In a recent article he asserts that, though many have des-
paired of the possibility of getting rid of war, he still believes
"that the road to a better state of affairs is still open to man-
kind.1'1 He observed that during the war many observed moral
rules simply in ord»r to make the war more effective, that is,
more destructive. So he realised that "rules of conduct, what-
ever they may be, are not sufficient to produce good results,
unless the ends sought are good." On one point he now agrees
with the Apostle ^aul, "that no obedience to moral rules can
take the place of love, and that where love is genuine, it will,
if combined with intelligence, suffice to generate whatever
moral rules are necessary."^ Here again is a abatement that re-
minds one very much of Kant ts principle of the Good Will as the
basic prinoiple in moral conduct.
we are still too much subject to fear, and need education
to a "more lordly psychology." Most of our fear and competition
is folly, for we have plenty of the necessities to go around, if
we would distribute them wisely. "International government,
business organization, and Tsirth control should make tne irorld
comfortable for everybody."0 But as long as armed forces are
maintained by independent nations there will be little security.
Only when force is controlled by a neutral authority will war
disappear from the world.
*Vhat I Believe," Forum, 82 (Sept., 1929), p. 131.
"Ibid. , p. 132.
3Ibid., o. 133.
-87-
D. Hi3 Views Regarding ^ro^erty and Economic Systems.
Russell holds that the worship of money is bound up with
inward defeat. Tha decay of life promotes tne religion of ma-
terial good; and this, in turn, hastens the decay of life. #e
who worships money has ceased to hope for happiness through his
own activities. Tne fear of losing money is also a cause of
worry, eating away men's power of happiness. The happiest peo-
ple are apt to he those with some purpose which shuts out an
interest in money. Yet all political thought occupies itself
chiefly with satisfying men13 economic desires.1
Russell sets forth four tests that may he applied to an
industrial system. (1) Does it tobtain maximum nroduction?
(2) Does it make for justice in di st ribution? 1 (3) Does it
allow a tolerable existence for the producers? . (4) Does it
give tne greatest possible freedom and stimulus to vitality and
progress? He claims that the present capitalistic system aims
at the first, maximum production. Socialism aims at the second
and third objects. The fourth purpose is really the most im-
portant, but neither capitalism nor orthodox socialism seeks it.*2
With modern methods of machine production, Russell believes
that a few hours labor a day would produce all that is really
needed, and that time now spent on producing luxuries could be
leisure for pursuit of education, art, and scientific investiga-
tion, thus developing the capacity for intelligent pleasure.
Russell would have all rent paid to the State. Inheritance
i^hj Men Fight , pp. 117-126
^Ibid., p. 127.
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-88-
simply creates an idle class, conservative and timid. Though it
is commonly thought that men labor to found an estate for a
family, Russell maintains that the "best work is done for interest
in the work for its own sake. Mary are actuated by the love for
■oower which money gives. Even if|slightly less work were done,
however, it would be worth while to abolish inheritance in order
to get rid of the idle rich, "with the oppression, feebleness,
and corruption which they inevitably produce. 1,1
He thinks there £3 no principle in the present economic
system. It started from conquest and ha3 oecome stereotyped by
law. Socialism, he thinks* aims at justice, and would attempt
to abolish the existing inequalities, on the principle of equal
income for equal service. Even this would not guarantee happi-
ness however. He believes that "The most important purpose
that political institutions can achieve is to keep alive in
o
individuals creat iveness, vigor, vitality, and the joy of life."
These things make for nappiness in living. A good system "should
not cramp men!s private affections," and it "should give the
greatest possible outlet to the impulse of creation."3 He thinks
that "the chief defect of the capitalistic system is tnat work
done for wages very seldom afforde any outlet for the creative
imoulse."4 ^he employee in industry must do simply what he is
told, and the production process divides up the labor, giving
each one only one little operation, so that the instinct for
creation finds no satisfaction in the work. Russell thinks,
*Ibid. > p* 137.
^Ibid. , p. 143.
Jibid. , p. 144.
Ibid., p. 145.
-89-
however, that socialism, with the State as the employer, would
he no better in thi3 respect. The defect is inherent in our
industrial system.
He believes that capitalism need not be abolished, but that
industry could be made more democratic. "The present economic
system, by robbing most men of initiative, is one of the causes
of the universal weariness which devitalizes urban and indus-
trial populations, making them perpet ually seek excitement."
As a result, even war is welcomed as a break in the routine.1
He thinks our whole system is "an abomination, " because it" sepa-
rates the man from the p-urpose for which the work is done,"
which is "concentrated in the capitalist," with the result that
the wage-e arner *s purpose is centered not in production, but
on wa£es. The capitalist seeks production, while the worker
seeks wages, so that the system cannot work smoothly or effi-
cient ly.2
also
Russell finds^many "pitfalls in socialism."0 He thinks
state control of industry would be no improvement over private
ownership. Stockholders would simply become holders of govern-
ment bonds. There would be no advance toward democracy in in-
dustry, since government officials are not apt to be sympathetic
to labor, so there would be no more freedom for employees, and
perhaps not as much. State socialism is not a truly democratic
system. There would be danger of dead uniformity in it. Also,
possession of power tends to produce love of power, and the
Jlbid., p. 147.
?Ibid.» p. 148.
Political Ideals, pp. 73-101.
-90-
power in the hands of officials might easily lead to oppression
of minority groups. "The problem of the distribution of power
is a moire difficult one than the problem of the distribution of
wealth."*
In a democracy, Russell thinks "the tyranny of the majority
is a real dangert" for right is often on the side of the minority,
and "progress comes through the gradual effect of a minority in
converting and altering custom."** He thinks also that, accord-
ing to the principles of democracy, any grouo has the right to
resort to direct action for amelioration of trade conditions,
for purposes of economic reconstruction, or for political ends.3
Russell believes that various industrial groups should be
autonomous in their own affairs, with a neutral authority to
adjust relations between groups. But, though the socializing of
industry might help, we must always be oareful not to regard
"man as a tool for producing goods, rather than goods as a sub-
ordinate necessity for the non-material side of human life."4
Industrialism has used science only from utilitarian mo-
tives, but Russell believes that ""Oure science is infinitely
more valuable than its applications." So far, its applications
"have been in the main harmful, and will only cease to be so
when men have a less strenuous outlook on life.." On the whole,
our social system is destructive of what is excellent. "If ex-
cellence is to survive, we must become more leisurely, more
just, less utilitarian, and less ■progressive.'"5
J-Ibid., p. 87.
2Ibid. , p. 93. , , . . _ AA Q
3"Democracy and Direct Action," Dial, 66(1919), pp. 445-448.
i"Where Is Indust rialism Going," Century, 107(1923), t>. 149.
5"Leisure and Mechanism," Dial, 7 5(1923) , pt>. 121-122.
-91-
E. What Science Can Do.
Science is chiefly re sponsible for the fact that man is no
longer so much at the mercy of his physical environment as for-
merly. "To the modern man," says Russell, "his physical envir-
onment is merely raw mateiial, an opportunity for manipulation."
To the modern industrialist everything is an instrument , and the
love of r>ower has found a means to satisfy itself in a measure,
though it means the thrusting aside of "all the other impulses
that make the complete human life. Love, parenthood, pleasure,
and beauty are of less acoount • . . .Manipulat ion and exploitation
are the ruling passions." The modern "big business men possess
more power than any humans ever had in the past. "They can
settle who shall starve and who shall become rioh, they can
divert the course of rivers, and decree the fall of governments.
Russell thinks it possible that science will enable man
to produce his food synthetically without the aid of plants and
animals. Men may learn to alter themselves, and "what they will
make of the species I do not venture to predict," s&ys Russell.3
With the decrease of the death and birth rates populations will
tend to become stable. Predetermination of sex may become pos-
sible, and it is bard to tell what tne effect of this might be.
Through psychology the thinking and desires of men may be al-
tered and regulated. "The power of r>sycnological technique to
mould the mentality of the individual is still in its infancy.
-'•The Scientific Outlook, t>. 151.
^Ibid., pp. 152-153.
3Ibid., p. 165.
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-92-
and is not yet fully realized."! Propaganda, especially through
the press and the moving pictures ( cinema) , plays a very great
part in molding society.
l."The Scientific Society."
Psychological and economic technique are making it possible
to create artificial forms of social organization to fulfill
certain purposes. The chief difficulty, Russell thinks, with
this is that it makes sudden changes in living habits wnich
creates a nervous strain that may have disastrous results. ^
The present economic depression shows the need for inter-
national organization, Russell claims. The result of modern
industrialism should be wealth, but it is, in fact, poverty.
"The advantages of world-wide organization, both in preventing
the waste of economic comoetition and in removing the danger of
war, are so great as to be becoming an essential condition for
the survival of societies possessing scientific technique,"3
He believes we must go on to world-wide organization un-
less we are to abandon scientific technique, but we will not do
this unless we suffer "a cataclysm so severe as to lower the
whole level of civilization."4 For, "science increases our
power to do both good and harm, and therefore enhances the need
for restraining destructive impulses. If a scientific world is
to survive, it is therefore necessary that men should become
kbid. , p. 185.
aIbid., t>T>. 206-208.
Jlbid., p. 212.
4Ibid., p. 213.
tamer than they have been."
In "the scientific society" the individual will fini him-
self and his activities mora regulated than at present, in the
interests of the whole group. Every government believes itself
omniscient, and, unless restrained by traditional prejudices,
"will advocate more interference with liberty than is wise."^
But things would be no better under socialism and communism than
under capitalism; perhaps they would be worse, since political
and economic power are concentrated in the same hands. Russell
fears that equality, like liberty, will prove to be "no more
than a 19th century dream."
The scientific government will "have its eye upon society
rather than upon the individual," and "will make the individual
suffer for the public good." It will regard the individual as
merely part of the social organism.3
It seems to me we should inquire whether this is a real
advance, or whether we should not be reverting, in -Drimciple, to
the old tribal ethios, which subordinated the individual com-
pletely to the group. If development is in cycles, perhaps we
are due for such a movement. Individualism has gone to an ex-
treme, some have thought, and now we are preaching social re-
sponsibility* Perhaps science will carry us to the other eatrene,
and we shall have to fight for our individualism again.
Of course, Russell admits that this is "a fancy picture,
and whatever really happens in the future is likely to be
kbid., p. 215.
iribid., p. 223
3Ibid., pt>. 234«235.
< <
-94-
something which cannot be foreseen." A scientific civilization
might prove "essentially unstable." It may be threatened by war,
and the falling birth-rate mey make the race fail to reproduce
its own numbers.1 It would take the adventure out of life, and
the security men have always sought would be had, but "they may
not think it worth the price they will have paid for it."2
Education in the scientific society would be designed to
train one grouo to rule and another to be ruled. The majority
of men and women would be taught to be "docile, industrious,
punctuali thoughtless, and contented." Contentment would be the
greatest virtue. 3
Scientific methods of breeding will be used in reproduction.
Fathers and mothers will be separated from their offspring, and
only mothers will be important to the process, except for eu-
genic purooses in producing the ruling classes. Artificial im-
pregnation and prematurely induced birth might make life even
more unnatural.
Russell foresees these things as possibilities of scienti-
fic technique carried to an extreme, but he is not enamoured of
the picture. Ks thinks that "Just as the sun worship of the
Aztecs demanded the painf ul death of tnousands of human beings
annually, so the new scientific religion will demand its halo-
oausts of sacred vict ims. . • .In the end such a system must break
down either in an orgy of bloodshed or the rediscovery of joy."4
xIbid. , op. 237-239,
|?Ibid., po. 241-242.
flbid., p. 243.
4Ibid. , pp. 258-2 59.
IV. Russell* 9 Attitude Toward Religion.
A. His Estimate of Traditional Religion and the Churches.
Russell thinks that the advance of learning, the development
of historical research, and scientific discovery have "battered
down some part of the edifice of Catholic dogma, i^xt'il, for almost
all thinking and instructed people, the most that seems defen-
sible is some inner spirit * some vague hope, and some not very
definite feeling of moral obligation* wi At any rate, ne believes
that "the decay of dogmatic religion is, for good or evil, one
of the most important f acts in the modern world."*
The Protestant religion is primarily personal, while the
Catholic religion is primarily social in outlook. The Catholic
Church, however, has hardened into a system preventing growth.
The clergy suffers from professionalism, which is a danger to
religion* The clergy should consist, he thinks, of men who
earn their living in other ways, and so do not fall into a re-
mote morality.3
A new spirit cannot come into the world through the be-
lievers in a traditional religion, for they are looking backward,
not forward* Also, the teaching of Christ, "admirable as it is,
remains quite inadequate for many of the social and spiritual
issues of modern life." If a religious view of life and the
world is to again dominate the thinking of free-minded men, it
must have "a morality of . initiative, not of submission; a
J-Why Men Fight, p. 215.
^Tbid., p. 216
3Ibid., pp. 218-220.
if
-96-
morality of hope rather than of fear, of things to be done rather
than things to be left undone."1 As his idea of what religion
should be, Russell gives the following:
"The religious life that we must seek will not be one of
occasional solemnity ani superstitious prohibitions, it will
not be sad and asoetiof it will concern itself little with
rules of conduct. It will be inspired by a vision of what
human life may be, and will be nappy with the joy of creation,
living in a large free world of initiative and hope. It will
love mankind, not for what they are to the outward eye, but
for what imagination shows that they have it in them to become.
It will not readily condemn, but it will give t>raise to posi-
tive achievement rather than negative sinlessness* to the joy
of life, the quick affection, the creative insight, by which
the world may grow young and beautiful and filled with vigor."
As I read this description of what Russell believes a modern
life-giving religion should be, it seems to me a remarkable em-
bodiment of what I find in the life and teachings of Jesus.
Russell has just condemned the teaching of Jesus as inadequate
for the needs of modern life, but here Russell has given us only
principles* not rules, which were the essence of the attitude of
Jesus toward mankind and the world.
The activities of men, Russell finds* are derived mainly
from three sources: instinct, mind, and spirit. To the life of
the spirit belongs art and religion. Here lies the possibility
of love or hate, reverence and worship, the "sense of obligation,"
the "feeling of imperativeness," and of "acting under orders*"
Yet "deeper than all these there lies the sense of a mystery
half revealed, of a hidden wisdome and glory, of a transfiguring
vision in which common things lose their solid importance and
become a thin veil toehind which the ultimate truth of the world
J-Ibid.f po« 221-222.
2Ibid. , pp. 222-223-
-97-
is dimly seen." Such feeling9 are "the source of religion," and
if they should die our "most of what is test would perish out of
life."1
Though Russell has a very high estimate of religion itself,
the traditionalism of the church arouses his ire. Because of it,
he thinks the church has opposed movements for freedom, and have
encouraged blood-thirsty wars, so that the world would have been
better off without the church for the last six hundred years. If
society is to improve, he thinks it must be emancipated from the
church, and he finds the decay of religion one of the hopeful
signs of the present.2
In primitive times most men were agriculturalists or fisher-
men and had to contend with natural forces, which seem to arouse
the religious feelings. Modern men work mostly in industrial
plants where they see little of natural forces at work, so they
tend to atheism and materialism. Therefore, Russell thinks,
"The fact is that religion is no longer sufficiently vital
to take hold of anything new; it was formed long ago to suit
certain ancient needs, and has subsisted by force of tradition,
but is no longer able to assimilate anything that cannot be
viewed traditional. . Hence the alteration of daily habits
and interests resulting from industrialism has proved fatal
to the religious outlook, which has grown dim even among those
who have not explicitly rejected it."3
He thinks also that belief in God for many modern people has
come to serve a utilitarian purpose for improving the world. For
intellectual reason, too the idea of God has become vague compared
to what it was for those aeeepting traditional ideas. Furthermore,
the churches are not an acceptable basis for modern idealism,
xIbid., pt>. 226-227. 2greeman. 7(1923). p. 224.
3"Where Is Industrialism Going nt ury , 107 (1923), p. 148.
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*
-98-
since, through their endowments, they "have become bound up with
the defense of property • They tend also to have "an oppressive
ethic" toward pleasures that the young find harmless. A young
man, accepting "whole-heartedly the teaching of Christ," is
likely to find himself in opposition to official Christianity,
as much an outcast as a militant atheist.^
B. His Own Religion,
Although Russell can find no satisfaction in anything that
traditional religion has to offer, he does have a very high re-
gard for the spiritual elements of life, as we have frequently
noted* The life of the spirit, he says,
"Brings with it the joy of vision, of the mystery and pro-
fundity of the world, of the contemplation of life, and above
all the joy of universal love. It liberates those who have it
from the prison-house of insistent personal passion and mun-
dane cares. It gives freedom and breadth and beauty to menfs
thoughts and feelings, and to all their relations with others*
It brings the solution of doubts* the end of the feeling tnat
all is vanity. It restores harmony between mind and instinct,
and leads the sei>arated unit back into his place in the life of
mankind. For those who have once entered the world of thought,
it is only through the spirit that happiness and peace can
return."*
Russell thinks that those who have tried to find support
for religious belief in the recent statements of some scientists
regarding the uncertainty discovered in the causal laws do not
realize the implications of the assumption. If we cannot depend
upon causal laws, than all inference fails, and we cannot "know
anything outside of our personal experience."3 He also finds
Why Is Modern Youth Cynical?" Harper1 s> 150(1930) <pp. 721.
2Why Men Fight , p. 244.
3The Scientific Outlook*, p. 107.
99
no evidence in science that the world was made by a Creator. It
may seem odd that the universe should begin spontaneously, "but
there is no law of nature to the effect that things which seem
odd to us must not happen* N He then adds this pessimistic note,
"I see no comfort to he derived from the supposition that this
very unpleasing universe was manufactured of set purpose*"1
The problem of evil seems to stand insurmountably in the
way of belief in God for Kussell.
"For aught that I know to the contrary, there may be a
Being of infinite power who chooses that children should die
of meningitis, and older people of cancer; these things occur,
and occur as the result of evolution* If, therefore, evolu-
tion embodies a Divine ^lan, these occurences must also have
been planned. Again, I am told that tnough the child himself
may not have sinned very deeply, he deserves to suffer on
account of his parents' wickedness. I can only repeat that,
if this is the Divine sense of justice, it differs from mine,
and that I think mine superior. •« .Fort unately, however, the
evidence of Divine Purpose is non-existent; so at least one
must infer from the fact that no evidence is adduced by those
who believe in it. We are, therefore, spared the necessity
for that attitude of impotent hatred which every brave and
humane man would otherwise be called upon to adopt towards
the Almighty Tyrant."2
Russell has a religion of his own, however, and I think
i s
we may say that science is its creed. "Science^in its essence
nothing but the systematic pursuit of knowledge, and knowledge,
whatever ill uses bad men may make of it, is in its essence
good. To lose faith in knowledge is to lose faith in the best
of man's capacities; and therefore I repeat unhesitatingly that
the unyielding rationalist has a better faith and a more unbend-
ing optimism than any of the timid seekers after the childish
comfort 8 of a less adult age."3
^tii., p. 118.
2lbid. , po. 130-131.
3Ibid., pp. 132-133.
i. I
-100-
The ethics of Christianity is individual, P.uasell notes,
but the new scientific ethic whicn he thinks is developing has
Mits eye upon society rather than upon the individual. "* This
is another reason why Russell finds no place for traditional
religion in the new scientific society.
1. "Science and Values. w
"Perhaps it would he unfair to Russell to leave the considera-
tion of his views on science without noting his estimate of
values as against science*
In the scientific society as he has outlined it, Russell
admit 8 that "the power impulse has completely overwhelmed the
impulse of love, and this is the psychological source of the
cruelties which it is in danger of exhibiting." Further, he
believes that this "scientific society .... is incompatible with
the pursuit of truth, witn love, with art, with spontaneous de-
light, with every ideal that men have hitherto cherished."2
The danger lies in power sought for its own sake, not "for the
sake of genuine good."
Russell thinks that he who enjoys nature need not feel he
has lived in vain, and if science makes it possible for more
people to realize these joys, it will be doing well, but
"When it takes out of life the moments to which life owes
it 8 value, science will not deserve admiration, however
cleverly and however elaborately it may lead men along the
road to despair. The sphere of valines lies outside science,
except in so far as science consists in the pursmit of knowledge.
(^Ibid., on. 234-235.
2Ibid. , pp. 263-234.
-101-
Science as the pursuit of power must not obtrude upon th3
sphere of values, and scientific teonnique, if it is to enrich
human life, must not outweigh the ends which it should serve."1-
Yet Russell will give values no objective existence among
the realities of the universe!
He complains that the men who dominate our world are for
the most part men who are contemptuous of the past. They know
nothing of history and care not for its wisdom. "Men in the
past were often parochial in space, but the dominant men of our
age are parochial in time. They feel for the past a contempt it
does not deserve, and for the present a sespect that it deserves
still less." We should learn as a maxim: "It is better to do a
little good than much harm."'2 We should also realize that the
supreme good is not rapid locomotion nor production of material
good.
Russell believes tnat "Even more important than knowledge
is the life of the emotions. A world without delight and with-
out affection is a world destitute of value." We must not be-
come "so intoxicated by new power as to forget the truths that
were familiar to every previous generation. Uot all wisdom is
new, nor is all folly out of date." Scientific technique will
be dangerous unless we develop a new moral outlook in which
"submission to the powers of nature is replaced by respect for
what is best in man."^
llbid., pp. 254-265.
2Ibid., px>. 267-258.
3lbid., p. 269.
-102-
V. What I Think About Russell and His Ethical Views.
For the most part I have very much enjoyed the writings
of Hub sell tnat I have gone tnrough. At times he amuses me,
at times he makes me angry, "but nearly always he makes ms think.
His usually keen analysis and his ready wit, with its irony and
sarcasm, make his studies of social problems especially inter-
esting. Though I cannot alwfrys agree with him, I can often sym-
pathize with his conclusions when I remember his point of view.
I appears to me that his "rugged individualism" often
clashes with his recognition of man's social responsibilities.
I have already criticized his ethics at some length. Although
he thinks that desire is the only standard for moral conduct,
which after all is no standard, he constantly regards the "good
life" as the real practical standard, and the good life he de-
fines in ideal terms. Again, while denying the theory of moral
obligation, he ia constantly recognizing it in urging man's duty
to seek the good life, and his responsibility to society.
Perhaps Russell is right in denying moral obligation in
theory in view of his metaphysics, for, as A. E. Taylor has
pointed out,l it is impossible to recognize persons as of moral
worth or having moral responsibility if the existence of persons
as entities is denied. If "I" am no more tnan a passing phase
of a chance arrangement of a string of "neutral entities," or
"events," then it is evident that to say "I ought" to do some-
thing has no significance that intelligence can recognize.
•^A. J£. Taylor, Art. on "Theism," Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics, p. 284.
4
<
-103-
Ruasell might do well to revise his met aphysios, and then he
could make his ethies more logical.
> Another place where Russell shows the need for a different
tneory of reality is in his theoretical and practical treatment
of values. Though he finds no place for values in the nature of
things, and gives them no permanent existence, he recognizes
them practically as the most real, the most significant, and the
best things in life.
The place wnere I find it most difficult to follow Kus3eli
in his practical morality is in his treatment of sexual morals.
He insists upon the utmost freedom in the sexual relations of
men and women, holding that they are ourely their own private
affair, since these relations affect no one Tout themselves.
Yet the sex instinct is the most social of all the instincts, and
its very purpose and significance i3 found in the propagation of
other persons, so that it seems to me he loses his social sense
here, Perhaps it is simply that in his reaction from conven-
tional morality he has swung to another extreme, but it seems
as if his rational outlook should give him better balance. One
is tempted to inquire if this is where he finds his moral standard
of desire.' Apparently, his own experience with marriage has not
been normally satisfactory, in that his first marriage was child-
less and ended in divorce, so that this may throw some light on
his attitude toward marriage and sex.
Although professedly atheistic and non-religious, I some-
times wonder if Russell has not a nobler religion of a type than
-104-
many who prof 333 to be religious in the orthodox sense.
Russell is a stimulating personality. He appears to be a
practical idealist who has fallen into irreconcilable contra-
dictions in his metaphysics* But no doubt we are all inconsis-
tent in spots, and biased on certain isaues, so it were well
not to throw too many stones • I would recommend the reading
of Ruseell to anyone who is not afraid to face the facts of
life and think- It will not do to read one or two articles or
essays, however, and think you know the man*
-10 5-
SUMltARY
A sketch of Russell fs life was first presents! and it was
noted that he is an apostle of freedom ani of sooial reform.
Then his viewpoint in philosophy was considered. He is a dualist
in epistemology , and a pluralistic realist in metaphysics, some-
times known as a "logical atomist." His views of the relations
of man to the universe were then considered, ani it appeared that
he considers man something of an anomaly in the system of nature,
doomed to struggle for his ideals without hope that the universe
will ever be on his side, since it has no place for these ideal
elements of life. It was noted too that he Relieves that the
analytic methods of science should he applied in philosophy.
In his ethical outlook, it appeared that Russell had a
rather objective view of the "good" in his earlier writings, but
later he turned toward subjectivism, holding that the "good" is
something which it "lies in our oower to caeate." After examin-
ing various theories of virtue, he come3 to the conclusion that
desire is the only standard of moral conduct. The "good" he now
regards as a "social concept" to aid in finding a way among con-
flicting desires. A study was then made of his concept of the
"Good Life," wnich he holds, "is inspired by love and guided by
knowledge," His theory of desire as the moral standard was next
criticized, as was also nis definition of the "Good Life." This
criticism holds that his theory might lend itself to the maxim
that "the end justifies the means," and also contends that,
though Russell claims that desire is the only moral standard,
it is really no standard, and that Russell himself has really
*Mtt«t
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<
t
r
< l: «-
-106-
aet up a standard for desire in hi a conception of the "Good
Life," wnich is an ideal standard.
Next was noted Russell's opposition to whatever is conven-
tional, traditional, or customary in morals, especially such as
might be thought to have any basis in superstition or irrational
fears. He regards superstition and fear as always and everywhere
bad. He blames Puritanism for tyrannous attitudes in some people
and inferiority in others. In sexual affairs Russell would cast
off all conventional restraints in the relations of individuals,
holding that society should be interested in marriage only in
case children issue from the union. The thwarting of the sexual
instinct and the love aspirations of life, he regards as one of
the greatest calamities that can occur to a person. He places
a very high estimate oa happiness, and thinks it is attainable
in the present world, provided we have a certain minimum of phy-
sical needs supplied, and that we develop the right psychological
attitudes. Science can helt» us to the first and education to
the second of these things, thus making the "Good Life" possible.
Education has usually been used to instil some political or
religious dogma or point of view, he thinks, but if properly
used it could develop "vitality, courage, sensitiveness, and
intelligence," thus opening up new life to man, and enabling
him to build a new world.
In his social views, Russell has not become attached to
any one theory or system, it appears. He would draw freely
from all proposed schemes, seeking an organization of society
in which the creative impulses of life should have opportunity
-107-
for full and free development, keeping always in mini that the
individual is M a unit in a great social organism, "The good
life," he believes, can Only be live in "a good society. • ^he
State he regards as something of a necessary evil, since it will
usually bring more regulation into individual life than is good,
though governments are necessary for accomplishing some things
that require large organization, such as education, nealth,
scientific research, and oromotion of law and order. However,
wars come as a result of the irresponsible use of power by
states, and he finds that war accomplishes much more evil than
good, so he advises an international neutral authority to regu-
late relations between states, doing away with the present anar-
chy among nations, which threatens the destruction of our civi-
lization.
Russell thinks it a mistake to regard the accumulation of
property as the chief end of life, and likely to distort life.
He would have whatever organization of economic life would give
men the most freedom and interfere least with instinctive happi-
ness. He thinks there should be as much autonomy in industrial
groups as possible.
In science he thinks there lies the means for man to become
the master of nature, removing most of the physical evils from
which the human race has suffered* He foresees the possibility
ef a "scientific society" in which the individual life would
be used simply as an element in the organism of society. He
thinks there is danger that such interference might easity go
-108-
so far as to make life so artificial that the instinctive life
of man would revolt, and this sort of a society would break
down*
Russell believes that traditional religion has become too
stereotyped and bound up with the maintainance of existing in-
stitutions to be capable of furnishing men with progressive
spiritual leadership , which is much needed, for he places a very
high valuation on the spiritual side of life. The problem of
evil seems to furnish an insurmountable obstacle to his belief
in God, He finds his oreed in science, but places his faith
in the ideal values of live, though he finds no place for them
in ultimate reality beyond man.
The thesis closed with the writer's own estimate of Russell
as a profound believer in ideals, but holding to a materialistic
metaphysics unfitted to his faith, and having, perhaps, an ab-
normal coxqplsx in regard to matters of sex.
r
109
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
(Se l#cted)
Works by Russell, B. A. W. .
German Social Democracy, London: Longmans, Green, 1895.
Problems of Philosophy, Hew York: Holt, n. d.
Philosophi cal Sssays, London: Longmans, 1910.
J ust i ce in War-Time, Chicago: Open Court, 1916.
Why Men Fight, H. Y. : Century, 1917.
Mysticism and Logic and Other assays, London: Longmans,
1919.~
^olitioal Idejils, B« Y»: Century, 1919.
Proposed Roads t_o Freedom, Socialism, Anarchism, and
Syndicalism, »• Y«: Holt, 1919. (Read cursorily).
The Problem of Cnina, E. Y. : Century, 1922. (Read in part)'.
How To Be Free and Happy . N. Y.: Rand School of Social
Science, 1924.
What I Believe, E. Y.: Dutton, 1925.
Education and tne Good Life, N. Y.: Boni & Liveright,
1926.
Philosophy, N. Y.: Norton, 1927.
Se le ct ed Papers of B_ertrand Russell, Selected and with a
Special Introduction "by Bertrand Russell, K. Y. :
The Modern Library, 1927.
Sceptical Essays, N. Y.:Sorton, 1928.
Also London: Allen & Unwin, 1928.
Marri age and Morals, U. Y. : Liveright, 1921.
Tne Conquest of Happiness, N. Y.: Liveright, 1930.
Tne Scientific Outlook, N. Y. : Norton, 1931.
Articles by Russell, B. A. W. ,
"Liberalism and Women* s Suffrage," Contemporary Review,
94 (1908), pp. 11-16.
""Pnilosophy of William James," Living Age,, 267 (1910),
pp» 52-55.
"National Independence and Internationalism," Atlantic,
119 (1917), pp. 522-528.
"Economic Unity and Political Division," Dial, 66 (1919),
pp. 529-531.
"Democracy and Direct Action," Dial, 35 (1919), pp. 445-
448.
"Why and Wherefore of Wishing for Tnings," Living Age,
304 (1920), pp. 528-533.
"Industry in Undeveloped Countries," Atlantic, 127
(1921) pp. 787-79 5.
"Socialism in Undeveloped Countries," Atlanta. c, 129
(1922) #p. 564-671.
-110-
"Toward An Understanding of China, " Century, 104 (1922),
pp. 912-aiS.
"Chinese Civilization and the West," Dial, 72 (1922),
po. 3 55-354 •
"Where Is Industrialism Going?" , Century. 107 (1923),
pp. 141-149.
"Freedom in Education," Dial, 74 (1923), pp. 153-154.
"Leisure and Mechanism, Dial, 75 (1923), pp. 105-122.
"Sources of Power," Freeman, 7 (1923), po. 176-179,
200-202, 224-225.
"Slavery and Self -Extermination," Nation, ii7 (1923),
pp. 32-34.
"ff We Are to Prevent the Next War," Century. 108 (1924),
pp.x 3-12.
"Motley Pantheon," Dial, 76 (1924), pp. 243-245.
"New Morals for Old; Styles in Ethics," Nation, 118
(1924), pp. 497-499.
"Life in the Middle Ages," Dial, 78 (1925) pp. 29 5-298.
"Socialism and Education," Harper !s, 151 (1925),
pp. 413-417.
"Things That H«ve Moulded Me," Dial, 83 (Sept., 1927),
pp. 181-185.
"Effective Intolerance," Ce nt ury , 115 (Jan., 1928),
po. 316-325.
"New Philosophy of America," Fortnightly Review, 129
(May, 1928), po. 518-523.
"Ostrich Cocke of Morals," Forum, 80 (July, 1928),
pp. 7-10.
"Twilight of Science," Cent ury » 118 (July, 1929),
pp. 311-315.
"What I Believe," Forum, 82 (Sept., 1929), pp. 129-134.
"Homogeneous America," Outlook and Independent, 154
(Feb. 19, 1930), pp. 285-287.
"Why Is Modern Youth Cynical?" Harper 's, ISO (May, 1930)
po. 720-724.
Articles by Russell, B. A. W., and Mrs. Dora,
"What Makes A Social System Good or Bad?" Ce nt ury , 104
(1922), po. 14-21.
"How Can Internationalism Be Brought About," Century, 104
(1922), po. 19 5-202.
Articles about Russell, B. A. W. ,
Durant, Will, The Story of Philosophy, pp. 518-529. N. Y:
Garden City Publishing Co. 1927.
Leighton, J. A., Tne Field of Philosophy, oo« 289-295.
N. Y.rApflleton, 1923.
<
111-
Rogers, A. K. , English ani Anerioan Philosophy Since
1800, pp. 429-440. M. Y. : Macmillan, 1922.
Articles on Rusaell, B. A. W. ,
Fite, W., •Philosophy of Bert rani Russell, " Nation,
98 (1914), pp. 180-182. —
"Man's War with the Universe in the Religion of Bert rani
Russell," (A review of "A Free Man's Worship"),
Current Opinion, 65 (1913), pp. 45-45.
"Thought of ""Bert rand Russell," (Reprint of article from
Steal's Review. Australia, June 11, 1921), Living
Age, 310 (1921), pp. 58 5- 589.
Stapledon, Olaf , "Mr. Bert rani Russell's Ethical Beliefs,"
International Journal of Ethics, 37, 4 (July, 1927),
pp. 390-402.
Kallen> H. M. , "Logical Form ani Social Salration," Dial,
33 (Dec*, 1927), pp. 469-473*
Ramsdell, a. T., "The Philosophy of Bert rani Russell,"
Metnodist Review, £• Y., 112 (May-June, 1929),
pp. 373-338.
Bruce, W. C, "Criticism of the Uew Morality," Current
History, 31 (March, 1930), 1105-1108.
Orton, William, "Social Philosophy of Mr. Bertrani Rus-
aell," American Economic Review, 14 (1924), pp. 209-
226.
Works referred to in Criticism,
Brightman, E. S., An Introduction to Philosophy. H. Y. :
Holt, 1925.
Brightman, E. S«, Religious Values, ft* Y.: Abingdon Press,
1925*
Everett, W. G. , Moral Values, Y. : Holt, 1918.
Taylor, A. E., Article on "Theism," Encyclopedia of
Religion ani Ethics, p. 284.
( (
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